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NOTE
TXO PRODUCTION CORP. v. ALLIANCE
RESOURCES CORP.: A FAILURE TO CREATE
TRUE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
AGAINST EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages1 historically have been a part of every legal system,
originating in ancient times.2 Traditionally, courts assess punitive dam-
ages against civil defendants whose conduct society seeks to punish and
1. Punitive damages are damages "over and above what will barely compensate [the
plaintiff] for his property loss." BLAcK's LAW DICnONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990). Courts
impose punitive damages to punish the defendant for outrageous tortious conduct. Id. In
contrast, courts grant compensatory or actual damages to "put plaintiffs back in the posi-
tion they would have been in had they not been injured." Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split
Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 473, 473 (1993). Nominal damages are trivial sums that courts award to
acknowledge the plaintiff's harm without compensation, such as a one-dollar award upon a
finding of liability. Id. Other terms used for punitive damages include "exemplary dam-
ages," "vindictive damages," or "smart money." Id. at 473 n.6.
2. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Dam-
ages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1285 (1993) (stating
that "[tihe doctrine of punitive damages has an ancient lineage" and discussing precursors
of punitive damages in ancient civilizations). See generally James R. May, Fashioning Pro-
cedural and Substantive Due Process Arguments in Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving
Punitive Damages After Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 22 ENVTL. L. 573, 581-
82 (1992) (discussing the history of punitive damages). Punitive damages in the United
States are based on Thirteenth Century England's system of amercements, which were
monetary penalties assessed against civil defendants. RiCHARD L. BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES § 1.2, at 5 (1991). Courts in the United States recognized the validity of punitive
damages as early as 1818. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1818) (initiating
Supreme Court jurisprudence on punitive damages); infra notes 97-109 and accompanying
text (discussing the early constitutional history of punitive damages in the United States).
For a detailed analysis of the historical basis of punitive damages, see John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 154-58
(1986).
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deter.3 Accordingly, the universal modem rule is that courts impose pu-
nitive damages only when a defendant acts beyond mere negligence.4
When a court assesses punitive damages against a civil defendant, that
defendant may claim that the amount of punitive damages awarded by
the jury is excessive and request that the court reduce the amount of the
award.' Alternatively, a defendant may challenge the punitive damages
award by asserting that the methods used to determine the necessity for
and amount of punitive damages violate several constitutional provi-
6sions, including the Double Jeopardy Clause7 and the Excessive Fines
3. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legisla-
tures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1365, 1369 (1993) (stating that "[p]unitive damages existed to
ferret out and impose a public sanction against antisocial conduct that was otherwise un-
deterred by the criminal law" (footnote omitted)); see May, supra note 2, at 574 (stating
that "[p]unitive damages serve to punish the tortfeasor, and to provide both specific deter-
rence, as to the tortfeasor, and general deterrence, as to other parties" (footnote omitted));
Nicholas K. Kile, Note, Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages: Down But Not
Out, 65 IND. L.J. 141, 142 (1989) (indicating that punitive damages punish and deter); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (same).
A less persuasive rationale for punitive damages is the "private attorney general" doc-
trine, which contends that punitive damages serve as an incentive for private citizens to
bring suit against wrongdoers. Sloane, supra note 1, at 480. Sloane suggests that, histori-
cally, punitive damages were intended to fill voids for nonpecuniary losses. Id.
4. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1291 (stating that in "early American puni-
tive damages cases, courts frequently premised awards on conduct that smacked of willful
and wanton indignities"). The Supreme Court's first decision on punitive damages indi-
cated that courts do not assess this type of penalty unless the defendant acts outrageously.
The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558-59. More recently, courts have required only that the
defendant commit reckless or malicious acts. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1305-07.
Although the standard may vary among the states, it is universal that "some element of
conscious wrongdoing is required." James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages: State Extraction
Practice Is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 120 (1990);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (noting that courts award puni-
tive damages for outrageous conduct). State law determines the standards for awarding
punitive damages. May, supra note 2, at 582.
5. See 2 JAMEs D. GHIARDI & JomN J. KIRCHNER, PuNIvE DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 18.01 (1985). The authors state that "[o]nce it has been determined ... that a
case has been presented involving the type of conduct providing the legal prerequisites for
the award of punitive damages ... most states hold that a trial or appellate court may
exercise limited control over the amount awarded by reducing excessive verdicts." Id. at
18-4.
6. Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Pro-
cess, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 859-60 n.3 (1991) (citing articles discussing constitutional at-
tacks against punitive damages).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id Advocates
assert that this constitutional provision is violated when a person is exposed to both crimi-
nal sanctions and punitive damages. 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.02 (Supp.
1994).
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Clause.' These constitutional arguments against excessive awards of pu-
nitive damages have failed in nearly all cases.9 Despite this lack of suc-
cess, increasingly large punitive damage verdicts have forced defendants
to continue making constitutional attacks on large punitive damages
awards."° Recently, the United States Supreme Court has addressed yet
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed." Id. Commentators argue that this
clause applies because punitive damages are "sufficiently criminal in nature to afford the
constitutional protections of the criminal defendant to the civil defendant." 1 GMIARDI &
KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.06 (Supp. 1994).
9. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64
(1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause provides no limits to punitive damages
when the litigation involves private parties); 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.02
(stating that most jurisdictions allow punitive damages even when the defendant may be
exposed to criminal sanctions, thus rejecting the double jeopardy argument); Riggs, supra
note 6, at 861 (stating that "[m]ost state and lower federal courts ... have refused to find
punitive damage awards in violation of ... any [ ] provision of the federal constitution").
10. BLA-r, supra note 2, at 5. Professor Blatt concluded that "punitive damage
awards are likely to play an increasingly important role in litigation . . . . This fact has
resulted in a full-scale constitutional challenge to punitive damage awards generally and to
excessive punitive damage awards in particular." Id. at 15. Similarly, Professor Riggs
stated that "the growing exposure of deep-pocket defendants to large punitive damage
awards has spawned a vigorous constitutional assault on the punitive damages system" and
summarizes the research on the size and frequency of punitive damage awards. Riggs,
supra note 6, at 859 & n.2 (footnotes omitted).
Courts awarded punitive damages infrequently and in nominal amounts prior to the
1950s. BLArr, supra note 2, at 5. Punitive damages are, however, becoming increasingly
more common and are appearing in dramatically large amounts. See generally id. at 10-13
(discussing the severity and frequency of punitive damage awards). Professor Schwartz
believes that punitive damages law has "broadened considerably beyond its origins" and,
consequently, "the frequency and size of punitive damages awards have 'skyrocketed.' "
Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1369-70; see also id. at 1369 n.26 (discussing reasons
for the increasing number of punitive damage awards, such as the application of punitive
damages to product liability cases, the allowance of repeated awards for one act in "mass
tort" litigation, and the allowance of punitive damages in contract actions).
Many scholars believe that there is a "crisis" due to the growing number of punitive
damage awards. See Jeffries, supra note 2, at 139 (suggesting that "punitive damages are
out of control"). Commentators argue that punitive damages have caused the liability in-
surance crisis, have permitted unfairly large jury verdicts, have prevented research and
development in the corporate world, and have been used inappropriately as a sword in
settlement negotiations. See Sloane, supra note 1, at 486-87. Others claim that punitive
damages are not in need of reform and that the issue has been politicized. Id.
This Note does not address these issues. For detailed discussions of whether reform is
necessary and what kind is appropriate, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and
Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1990) (discussing in detail various
arguments for and against reform, and whether there is a punitive damages crisis);
Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1375-85 (indicating legislative reforms that should be
adopted in the wake of Haslip); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American
Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: A Timely
Call for Punitive Damages Reform, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 263,265-274 (1993) (evaluating
proposed reforms); Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S.
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another constitutional attack on punitive damages: that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
limits the amount of punitive damages."
These due process claims rest on the premise that civil defendants are
entitled to procedural safeguards comparable to those provided to crimi-
nal defendants.' 2 This argument is based on a weak premise, however,
because strict constitutional protections apply uniquely to criminal-not
civil-defendants. 3 Nevertheless, courts are more receptive to various
due process concepts as a basis for challenging punitive damages than to
other constitutional challenges to these awards.'
4
CAL. L. REV. 839, 841 (1993) (discussing and citing arguments fc: either abolishing or
paying punitive damages to the state); Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Ap-
plication of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive
Damage Reform, 40 UCLA L. REv. 753, 755, 772-82 (1993) (indicating that there is a
public perception of a punitive damage crisis and need for reform, and evaluating punitive
damage reforms in four categories: abolishment, caps, procedural limits, and diverting a
portion to the state); Kile, supra note 3, at 163 (commenting that "[l]egislative action is
necessary to mend the constitutional infirmities of punitive damage law"); Sloane, supra
note 1, at 477-78 n.24, 483-85 (discussing state reform movements that award the state a
portion of all punitive damage awards and state reforms that raise the burden of proof and
cap the amount of punitive damages); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Punitives in Peril, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1989, at 46 (indicating that punitive damages are a "hot-button tort reform issue").
11. See generally Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (analyzing a due
process attack on a punitive damages award); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (same); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)
(same); 1 GHIAIi & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.03 (summarizing the due process attack
against punitive damages). The Due Process Clause prevents a state from engaging in acts
that "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.
Due process is a basic concept of the English legal system, dating back to the Magna
Carta. May, supra note 2, at 575 & n.5. The Fourteenth Amendment applies this concept
to American law. Id. at 575.
12. See Riggs, supra note 6, at 871-72 (explaining that "[t]he primary purpose of puni-
tive damages is retribution and deterrence-precisely the rationale underlying penal law.
If functionally the two types of proceedings are similar, then ... due process ought to
require the greater safeguards applicable to criminal prosecutions"); Jeffries, supra note 2,
at 139. Procedural protections to which a civil defendant is not entitled include: the right
to confront hostile witnesses; the protection against self-incrimination; the right to trial by
jury; and the right to a standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Sloane, supra note
1, at 475 n.15.
13. See 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.03 (stating that the Supreme Court
has held that criminal law procedural safeguards do not apply to civil punitive damages
defendants); Bruce J. Ennis, Punitive Damages and the U.S. Constitution, 25 TORT & INS.
L.J. 587, 593 (1989) (finding that lower courts reject this requirement because "[w]holesale
incorporation of the panoply of criminal procedural protections ... [is] inconsistent with
the basic rule that the necessity for according particular protections should be evaluated in
the context of the particular setting in which those protections are claimed").
14. See infra notes 110-92 and accompanying text (discussing modem jurisprudence
applying due process to punitive damages).
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Due process generally requires that legal procedures be fundamentally
fair.'" Thus, defendants attack punitive damage awards in two ways.'
6
First, an excessive punitive damage award may represent an unreasonable
and arbitrary taking of property that no rational state purpose can justify,
thus potentially violating substantive due process.' 7 Second, the method
by which courts assess and review punitive damages may fail procedural
due process requirements. 8
The United States Supreme Court addressed these arguments in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.19 Although the Haslip Court agreed
with the defendant that due process requirements apply to punitive dam-
ages, the Court upheld the punitive damage scheme in Alabama without
15. BLAr, supra note 2, at 19; see also Jeffries, supra note 2, at 151-52 (citing cases
indicating that, in any formulation, due process ultimately requires" 'fundamental fairness'
at the hands of the law" (footnote omitted)); May, supra note 2, at 575-76 (indicating that
fundamental fairness requires that the individual must have the opportunity to be heard
before a deprivation of his property, and must receive protection from erroneous
deprivation).
16. May, supra note 2, at 576 (stating that because due process protects procedural
and substantive rights, states must ensure that punitive damages are awarded "in both a
procedurally fair and substantively rational manner" (footnote omitted)).
17. BLATr, supra note 2, at 19. Professor Blatt notes that "the requirement of the Due
Process Clause that there be a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose is arguably
violated when a punitive damage award is very large in comparison to an accompanying
compensatory damage award." Id This argument encompasses what generally is known
as substantive due process. See Riggs, supra note 6, at 870 ("The argument for a substan-
tive due process check on punitive damages ... speaks primarily to the size of the award
.... [in that it is I so excessive in relation to a defendant's conduct and so disproportionate
to the damages actually incurred that imposing such a penalty is wholly arbitrary and un-
reasonable."); see also May, supra note 2, at 576 (stating that unlike procedural due pro-
cess issues, which focus on the process, the "substantive due process issues contemplate
results [and, consequently,] defendants may contend that the award so far surpasses associ-
ated compensatory damages that it becomes unconstitutionally excessive" (footnote
omitted)).
Defendants also attack punitive damages on a constitutional basis when a defendant
repeatedly is assessed punitive damages for the same course of conduct, as in the case of
mass tort litigation. May, supra note 2, at 576-77. Analysis of this constitutional argument
is outside the scope of this Note. For a general discussion of the multiplicity attack on
punitive damages, see id. at 614-16.
18. See BLATr, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing procedural due process within the con-
text of jury guidance); May, supra note 2, at 619 (explaining that states ensure procedural
due process by limiting jury discretion, which may be achieved by following common-law
standards that sufficiently guide the jury and provide for meaningful judicial review);
Riggs, supra note 6, at 872 (indicating that the procedural due process attack on the "ab-
sence of meaningful standards to guide the jury in determining liability for punitive dam-
ages and fixing the amount of the award" has "captured the attention of the Supreme
Court").
19. 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see infra notes 123-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Haslip).
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defining any clear constitutional limits.2" In the wake of judicial uncer-
tainty following Haslip, the Court addressed a similar challenge in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 21
TXO involved a contract establishing mineral rights between Alliance
and TXO.22 In 1984, TXO geologists discovered that a profitable oil and
gas repository existed under an area of land controlled by Alliance.
2 3
TXO and Alliance entered into an agreement in which TXO purchased
oil and gas rights to the land; TXO paid Alliance a per-acre price for the
rights, as well as a percentage of revenues that TXO earned from the
land.24 After entering into the agreement, TXO discovered a 1958 deed
that indicated that some of the rights to Alliance's land actually were
vested in Virginia Crews Coal Company. 25 Because this 1958 deed in-
volved land rights similar to those purchased by TXO, the deed purport-
edly gave TXO grounds to believe that there was a cloud on the title.2 6
Subsequent research, however, indicated that the 1958 deed conveyed
only coal rights, while Alliance explicitly had reserved the oil and gas
rights.27
Nevertheless, TXO attempted to use the purported title discrepancy to
achieve a bargaining position that would force Alliance to renegotiate the
royalty agreement.28 TXO first advised Alliance of the possibility that
its title was not valid.2 9 Second, TXO attempted to convince Virginia
Crews that Virginia Crews had a vested oil and gas interest in the land,
and then paid Virginia Crews for a quitclaim deed conveying to TXO any
interest Virginia Crews might have held."° Finally, TXO attempted to
induce the original holder of the 1958 deed to attest falsely that the deed
may have included some oil and gas rights.3
After failing in its attempt to renegotiate the royalty agreement with
Alliance, TXO filed a declaratory judgment action to remove the alleged
cloud from the title.32 TXO actually intended, however, to reduce its roy-
alty payments and, at the same time, increase its interest in the oil and gas
20. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4-24.
21. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
22. Id. at 2715.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id The 1958 deed involved respondent Tug Fork Land company, a predecessor in
interest to Alliance. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id. at 2716.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id at 2715-16.
32. See id
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rights, thereby making the contract more profitable for TXO.3 3 In adju-
dicating the declaratory judgment action, the court found that the deed
upon which TXO's claim of title rested was a" 'nullity.' "34
In response to TXO's action, Alliance demanded and received a jury
trial on a counterclaim for slander of title.35 The jury awarded $19,000 in
actual damages 36 and ten million dollars in punitive damages. 37 After the
trial court denied TXO's motions for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict3 8 and remittitur,39 TXO appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia.'
On appeal, TXO claimed that the ten million-dollar punitive damage
award violated the Due Process Clause4' as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in Haslipn2 and by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc. ,3 a case decided after
TXO's trial. TXO requested a new trial, arguing that because its trial did
not provide the procedural requirements of Games, TXO was entitled to
a new trial on the issue of punitive damages." The state supreme court
33. Id The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that TXO "knowingly
and intentionally brought a frivolous declaratory judgment action against the appellees to
clear a purported cloud on title." TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419
S.E.2d 870, 875 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). The court also found that
TXO's quitclaim deed from Virginia Crews was "an attempt to steal [Alliance's] land." Id.
at 881.
34. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2716 n.8 (explaining that TXO did not obtain oil or gas rights
from Virginia Crews because the Hawley Mining Company never conveyed title for those
rights to Virginia Crews).
35. Id. at 2716, 2717 n.14 (describing slander of title as a long-recognized common law
tort).
36. Id at 2717. The actual damages represented Alliance's costs for defending the
declaratory judgment action. Id.
37. Id. at 2716-17. The jury heard evidence indicating that TXO, a wealthy subsidiary
of a very large company, knew that Alliance had clean title; that TXO acted in bad faith;
that the amount of royalties TXO sought to "renegotiate" was substantial; and that TXO
had acted similarly in other business dealings throughout the country. Id.
38. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is "a judgment rendered in favor of one
party notwithstanding the finding of a verdict in favor of the other party." BLACK'S LAW
DICMIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990).
39. Remittitur is the process by which the judge reduces a jury's excessive award in-
stead of remanding the damages issue for a new trial. Id. at 1295.
40. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2717.
41. Id.
42. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
43. 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
44. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 886 (W. Va. 1992),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). In response to Haslip, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Games reversed and remanded the $105,000 punitive damages award for oper-
ating a solid waste disposal facility as a nuisance when the jury awarded no compensatory
damages. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 900. The Games court found that Haslip required specific
procedural rules that limit jury discretion and that provide for sufficient trial and appellate
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determined a new trial was unnecessary because it would be "especially
diligent" in reviewing punitive damages awards when the lower court did
not utilize the Games protections at trial.45
To determine whether the award was reasonable, the court focused on
three factors: the maliciousness of TXO's actions, the potential harm re-
sulting from those actions, and the amount of damages needed to deter
TXO from future misconduct.46 TXO's history of damaging behavior
and the particularly egregious behavior that it had exhibited with Affi-
ance were factors that strongly influenced the court's decision to affirm
the award.47
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. 48 Six justices
agreed that the award did not violate due process. 49 A plurality of the
court review. Id. at 908. To satisfy these requirements, the court outlined specific factors
for the jury and reviewing courts to consider in making and evaluating punitive damages
awards. See id. at 908-10. Because TXO was decided prior to Games, the court did not
give TXO the benefit of the Games protections. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 886. TXO argued
that it should be granted a new trial on punitive damages because it did not receive the
Games protections. Id.
45. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 886. The court reasoned that the thorough review would pro-
vide TXO with the Games protections at the appellate, rather than the trial, level. Id.
Prior to analyzing the TXO award, the court discussed various categories of defendants
who the courts have found liable for punitive damages after Haslip. See id. at 886-87
(noting the importance of first determining the severity of the defendant's conduct). The
court concluded that the limit on punitive damages would vary depending on the type of
category that the defendant fit. Id. Using very colorful language, the court placed punitive
damage defendants into three categories: "(1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean
defendants; and, (3) really stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal of harm
by their actions but who actually caused minimal harm." Id. at 887-88 (footnote omitted).
"Really stupid defendants" were those who did not harm victims intentionally, but who
caused harm through extreme carelessness. Id. at 888. For "really stupid defendants," the
outer limit of punitive damages is five times greater than compensatory damages, except
when the actual damages are either nominal or very large. Id. at 889. Because "really
mean defendants" intentionally commit harmful acts, the court determined that the limits
must be greater to deter their conduct. i Therefore, an award 500 times actual damages
would be acceptable so long as it would "reasonably... attract the defendant's attention."
I (explaining that an award 500 times greater than actual damages is not per se
unconstitutional).
46. Id. at 889. In applying these factors, the court stated that "[t]he type of fraudulent
action intentionally undertaken by TXO in this case could potentially cause millions of
dollars in damages to other victims." Id. Additionally, the court found that the reprehen-
sibility of TXO's actions clearly justified the award. Id Finally, the court noted that a
large penalty was necessary to "discourage TXO from continuing its pattern and practice
of fraud, trickery and deceit." Id. at 889-90.
47. Id
48. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993).
49. Id. at 2714. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas agreed that the award did not violate due
process. IM at 2714, 2724, 2726.
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Supreme Court found that the amount of the punitive damages award
was reasonable and that the procedures the courts employed satisfied due
process.
50
This Note discusses different methods that courts use to determine
whether punitive damage awards are constitutional. This Note first com-
pares the standards that courts used prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip with the standards
developed in the wake of that decision's constitutional mandates. This
Note then examines TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
and assesses its effects on the constitutional requirements in a punitive
damages context. 51 This Note suggests that while there is a framework of
due process protection against excessive punitive damages, there are no
clear standards for applying that framework. This Note concludes that
the uncertain rationale underlying the Court's decision in TXO impinges
on both procedural and substantive due process protections from exces-
sive punitive damage awards.
I. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING EXCESSIVENESS
Courts historically have limited the jury's discretion to award punitive
damages.52 The protection that the courts provided, however, did not de-
velop out of due process considerations; rather, the courts examined the
reasonableness of the award to determine if it was excessive.53 In so do-
ing, the standards that the courts used did not have a unifying framework
and, as such, the approaches ranged from extremely subjective tests to
detailed objective examinations of several factors.
50. See id at 2722, 2724 (affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia).
51. The scope of this Note is limited to the due process issues of punitive damages.
This Note does not discuss policy issues, namely whether there is a crisis resulting from
large punitive damage awards, and if so, what methods should be used to restructure the
system. See Riggs, supra note 6, at 874-75 & n.67 (distinguishing between constitutional
and policy questions and detailing law review articles on policy aspects); see also supra
note 10 (citing literature regarding reform movements in the punitive damage crisis).
52. 2 GmiARDi & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.01 (stating that "most states hold that
a trial or appellate court may exercise limited control over the amount awarded by reduc-
ing excessive verdicts").
53. Id § 18.05 (stating that courts must judge excessiveness on a case-by-case basis,
utilizing flexible standards for guidance). Various states have developed factors to assist
them in determining the reasonableness of punitive damage awards. Id. § 18.05 (Supp.
1994).
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A. General Excessiveness Standards
Courts that used subjective standards retained a limited supervisory
function over punitive damages, allowing the jury great discretion when
determining the proper amount to award. 4 In reviewing awards, these
courts often couched their standards of review in vague terms, such as
"clearly excessive;"55 "when the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock
the court's conscience; '56 when "the verdict represents a monstrous or
shocking injustice;"57 if the jury's verdict indicated some type of passion
or prejudice; 58 and if " 'it clearly appears that the amount awarded re-
sulted from caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other im-
proper influence.' ,59 Under these general excessiveness standards, the
appellate court gave almost complete discretion to the trial court to re-
view the award,60 an approach that apparently resulted from the hesi-
54. See id § 18.04 (noting the great deference paid to the jury's decision to award
punitive damages such that "[o]nly in extreme cases can a trial or appellate court interfere
with the jury's determination" (footnotes omitted)). But cf id. (Supp. 1994) (noting that
Montana and Kansas enacted statutes reducing jury discretion). In Montana, the trial
judge must review the award and may increase or decrease it as necessary. Id In Kansas,
the statute ensures that juries decide only if the punitive damages are appropriate, and the
court determines the amount. Id.
55. Embassy/Main Auto Leasing Co. v. C.A.R. Leasing, Inc., 508 N.E.2d 331, 335-36
(Ill. App. Ct.) (upholding $50,000 in punitive damages against a landlord for misappropria-
tion and tortious interference with business), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1987); see
also Statler v. Catalano, 521 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Ill. App. Ct.) (noting that "a reviewing court
will not reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded unless the award is clearly exces-
sive" (citing Smith v. Seiber, 469 N.E.2d 231 (1984)), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 265 (Ill.
1988).
56. American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d. 1135, 1146-47 (8th
Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining a
$250,000 award of punitive damages for tortious interference against a manufacturer in
favor of a former franchisee) (citing Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 716 F.2d 485, 488
(8th Cir. 1983) (en banc)).
57. Id. (citing Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1149-50 (8th Cir.
1984)).
58. Dependable Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 So. 2d 804, 807 (Ala. 1987).
59. Walder v. Lobel, 488 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (quoting Tonik v. Apex
Garages, Inc., 275 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. 1971)).
60. See American Business Interiors, 798 F.2d at 1146 (citing Murray v. Fairbanks
Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1979)). Appellate courts find that this discretion is
justified because it is the trial court that evaluates the evidence and is familiar with the
community's standards. Murray, 610 F.2d at 153 ("The trial judge is in the best position to
evaluate the evidence and assess whether the jury's verdict is rationally based."); see also
Davis v. Gage, 712 P.2d 730, 731 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the amount of punitive
damages is within the discretion of the trial court) (citing Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv.
Corp., 665 P.2d 661 (Idaho 1983)). See generally 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5,
§ 18.01, at 18-67 (Supp. 1994) (concluding that whether and in what amount to award puni-
tive damages has traditionally been considered a jury issue). But cf. Shamblin's Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 873 F.2d 736, 742 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Seventh
Amendment does not require that the jury determine punitive damages).
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tancy of appellate courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the
jury.
61
These types of standards provided little guidance for courts to deter-
mine whether an award was proper.62 The ambiguous terminology that
courts used to define excessive punitive damages resulted in courts hap-
hazardly applying various principles to determine if an award was exces-
sive.63 For example, a court that applied a deferential abuse of discretion
standard could affirm almost any award.64 Another court could uphold
an award by considering just one of a variety of factors.65 Alternatively, a
court could base its decision that an award was excessive66 on any one of
the same factors.67 Thus, the use of a general excessiveness standard re-
61. Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 464, 469 (Ohio 1989), superseded by
statute as stated in Akron-Canton Waste Oil v. Safety-Kleen Oil Servs., 611 N.E.2d 955, 966
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992). The general rule is that "the amount of punitive damages.. . rests
largely within the determination of the trier of fact." Id.
62. See Embassy/Main Auto Leasing Co. v. C.A.R. Leasing, Inc., 508 N.E.2d 317, 335
(I11. App. Ct.) (stating that "[t]here are no clear guidelines in Illinois for determining when
such [punitive damage] awards are excessive" (citing Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983))), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 106 (I11.
1987).
63. See 2 GHIAnRH & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.05, at 18-16. The authors univer-
sally find that "no one fixed formula exists nor can one be devised by which to measure the
award's excessiveness with mathematical precision." ld. (footnote omitted). Rather,
courts utilize a fact-based approach guided by "a combination of rough judicial standards."
Id.
64. See, e.g., American Business Interiors, 798 F.2d at 1147 (upholding the jury's award
of punitive damages because of a lack of clear evidence of excessiveness); Oppenhuizen v.
Wennersten, 139 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) (stating that there is no set rule to
determine the excessiveness of a punitive damage award).
65. See, e.g., Villella, 543 N.E.2d at 469 (finding that the defendant's "total disregard
for the law and the rights of appellee" justified an award of $150,000 in punitive damages
even though the jury awarded only $250 in actual damages); Statler v. Catalano, 521
N.E.2d 565, 572-73 (I11. App. Ct.) (finding punitive damages not excessive in light of de-
fendant's "extremely outrageous and malicious" actions), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 265
(Ill. 1988); Embassy, 508 N.E.2d at 336 (focusing on the failure of the moving party to meet
its burden of proving excessiveness); Davis v. Gage, 712 P.2d 730, 731 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985) (determining that a $10,000 punitive damage award was not excessive where defend-
ant breached a covenant not to compete and inflicted emotional distress); Tower Oil and
Technology Co., Inc. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (justifying
award to punish the defendant).
66. Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. National Communications Indus., Inc., 300 So.
2d 716, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (reversing an excessive punitive damages award
based upon nominal compensatory damages), cert. dismissed, 337 So. 2d. 809 (Fla. 1976).
67. See Cunningham v. Simpson, 461 P.2d 39, 44-45 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (comparing
libel cases to find the award excessive). Similarly, if the record indicates jury antipathy
towards the defendant, then "passion or prejudice" may cause a disproportionate award,
thereby requiring reversal. Id. at 45 (alterations in original) (quoting Morris v. Standard
Oil Co., 205 P. 1073 (Cal. 1922); Washer v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 197 P.2d
202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)). When the amount of the award "shock[s] the judicial con-
science," the court will examine the rationale supporting the award. Elyria-Lorain, 300 So.
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sulted in a variety of approaches that utilized ambiguous standards and
provided little guidance.'
B. Single Factor Tests for Finding Excessiveness
Some courts avoided the problems associated with the use of a general
excessiveness test by considering specific factors when determining the
reasonableness of an award, thereby reducing the subjective nature of the
evaluation.69 These courts focused specifically on a single factor to evalu-
ate the validity of a punitive damage award.70 One factor commonly con-
sidered by these courts was the wealth of the defendant.7' Other
decisions emphasized similarly objective, numerical factors, such as the
2d at 719 (quoting Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). After the
Elyria-Lorain court thoroughly examined the facts, it concluded that the jury misunder-
stood the law, or that the jury's decision was a result of "passion or prejudice." Id. at 719.
68. 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.07 (noting the subjective nature of this
test); cf Cunningham, 461 P.2d at 45. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Judge Mosk dissented in the
decision to reverse the punitive damage award, noting that the award of $25,000 did not
"shock[ ] the [judicial] conscience," so much that the reviewing court should replace its
judgement for that of the trial court. Id. The differences between the majority and minor-
ity view of the facts in Cunningham illustrates the ambiguous nature of this approach. Id.
69. See infra notes 71-83 (discussing single factor tests of excessiveness).
70. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (indicating single factor approaches).
71. See Vogel v. Bushnell, 221 S.W. 819,824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920) (holding that a puni-
tive damage award that appropriated all of the defendant's wealth was clearly excessive);
see also 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.08, at 18-33 (Supp. 1985) (stating that
"consideration of the defendant's wealth to gauge an award's size is probably the most
logical and empirically workable guide that juries and courts have, since it is based on a
tangible and quantifiable entity within the record" (footnote omitted)).
A punitive damages award is clearly excessive if the jury renders an amount that could
potentially cause the defendant financial ruin. Arab Termite & Pest Control v. Jenkins,
409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 1982); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., Inc.,
359 N.E.2d 566, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (finding an award of $50,000 in punitive damages,
when compared to the defendant's annual profits of millions annually, was not clearly ex-
cessive); see also 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.05, at 18-30. Conversely, if
punitive damages do not cause financial ruin, courts hold that they are not excessive.
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). Although the Transgo court considered other factors in up-
holding a punitive damage award, the court predominantly focused its reasoning on the
defendant's financial position. Id The award represented 5% of one defendant's net
worth and 2.5% of the other's, and the court concluded that these awards were not exces-
sive because they did not impose great financial hardship on either defendant. Id Yet,
when the defendant's financial condition interacted with other factors, courts often consid-
ered the financial position to be dispositive of the issue of excessiveness. See, e.g., Gregg v.
U.S. Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d 1462, 1477 (11th Cir. 1989) (considering a punitive damages
award that was based on the degree of defendant's misconduct and ability to pay not exces-
sive); T.D.S., Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1985) (same).
Although these cases considered two factors, the courts made it clear that the financial
position of the defendant, an objective factor, was determinative of the issue of excessive-
ness. See Gregg, 887 F.2d at 1477; T.D.S., 760 F.2d at 1530-31.
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mathematical relationship between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages.7 2 Rather than requiring a fixed numerical ratio, these courts deter-
mined that the punitive damages had to be proportional in amount to the
compensatory damages.73
Similarly, other courts compared the harm resulting from the defend-
ant's actions with the punitive damage award,74 and evaluated whether
the record supported the award.7" Thus, these courts examined the ratio
between actual and punitive damages, or the relationship between the
injury inflicted and the punitive damages imposed.76
Courts also evaluated awards in light of the two purposes of punitive
damages: punishment and deterrence.77 Evaluations of the amount of the
award in relation to these goals defined the boundaries of excessive-
ness.78 An award was not excessive unless it exceeded an amount neces-
sary to punish or deter.79 This "purpose" approach required courts to
72. See 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.06, at 18-19 (Supp. 1985) (stating
that courts often consider "the relative ratio between the amount of actual damages
awarded by the jury and the amount of punitive damages"); see also Contractor Utility
Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Corp., 748 F.2d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1029 (1985). In Contractor Utility, the court required the punitive damages to be propor-
tional to the compensatory damages. Id. However, because the record did not establish a
clear ratio, the court examined other relevant facts. Id Courts that take this approach
often compared the punitive damage award before them to awards that other courts made
in similar cases. Id The ratio was most crucial when a trial or appellate court reduced
compensatory damages, in which case the court was compelled to reduce the punitive dam-
ages as well, to maintain the same ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages.
See, e.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that when a court
reduces compensatory damages, it also must reduce punitive damages by the same margin
to avoid an excessive award); Natco Inc. v. Williams Bros. Eng'g Co., 489 F.2d 639, 640 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding it proper for a trial court to reduce punitive damages when it reduced
actual damages).
73. See supra note 72 (citing cases requiring proportionality).
74. See Morrissey v. Welsh Co., 821 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1987); see also 2
GHLA.RI & KmICHNER, supra note 5, § 18.08, at 33 (stating that courts often look to the
defendant's conduct to evaluate the award).
75. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 925 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (finding a one million dollar punitive damage award for slander reasonable in rela-
tion to the $296,000 compensatory damage award).
76. See, e.g., Ogilvie, 641 F.2d at 586 (requiring the trial court to reduce both punitive
and compensatory damages proportionally to ensure that the punitive damages bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the injury sustained).
77. See Nichols v. Shelter Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1158, 1166 (5th Cir. 1991). Generally,
most courts concur that the function of punitive damages is to punish and deter defend-
ants. See 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.08.
78. See generally 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 18.08 (indicating that the
purposes of punitive damages are often a fundamental basis in courts' evaluations of the
amount of an award).
79. See Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that courts con-
sider punitive damages excessive only if the amount exceeds what is needed to punish and
deter); see also DeRance, Inc. v. Painewebber, Inc., 872 F.2d 1312, 1328 (7th Cir. 1989)
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consider other factors, such as the seriousness of the wrongdoing," the
wealth of the defendant,"' and the amount of punitive damages awarded
in similar cases' to determine whether an award served society's goals.
Accordingly, even when courts focused on one factor they necessarily an-
alyzed several additional factors, an approach that created a more de-
tailed framework for evaluating an award.8 3
C. Intensive Multi-factor Scrutiny
Evaluating a punitive damage award under the single factor test was
misleading because it necessarily required an analysis of several other rel-
evant factors.84 Some courts avoided this problem by mandating consid-
eration of many relevant factors,85 including the nature of the
defendant's actions, the degree of wrongdoing, the reprehensibility of the
actions, the economic status of the defendant, and the punishment and
deterrence purposes of the award.'
(reducing a twenty million dollar punitive damages award to seven million dollars because
it exceeded what was required to punish and deter the defendant).
80. DeRance, 872 F.2d at 1330 (holding that if the seriousness of a wrongdoing is not
commensurate with the injury, the court may reduce the punitive damages).
81. Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 151 (considering the defendant's gross income).
82. Nichols v. Shelter Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1158, 1167 (5th Cir. 1991); DeRance, 872
F.2d at 1329-30.
83. Nichols, 923 F.2d at 1167.
84. See DeRance, 872 F.2d at 1329-30.
85. See Estate of Korf v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods. Inc., 917 F.2d 480, 485 (10th
Cir. 1990) (finding that an examination of the relevant factors defined whether the verdict
was "shocking to the conscience or leads to the inescapable inference of improper jury
passion or prejudice"); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 825 F.2d 133, 142 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying several factors to determine whether" 'the jury was guided by passion and
by prejudice'" (quoting Murphy Auto Sales v. Coomer, 112 N.E.2d 589, 593-94 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1953))); Sulecki v. Southeast Nat'l Bank, 516 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(applying several factors to determine whether a punitive damage award "shocks one's
sense of justice"); Coale v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 P.2d 885, 889 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (hold-
ing that determinations of excessiveness are based on several relevant factors, and not
solely on ratios).
86. See Estate of Korf, 917 F.2d at 485 (finding that relevant factors include the nature
of the act, the defendant's economic status, the deterrence effect, and the relation to com-
pensatory damages); Keehr, 825 F.2d at 142 (stating that relevant factors include the nature
of the tort, the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the defendant's economic
position); Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp., 274 Cal. Rptr. 139, 146
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (examining the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
the defendant's wealth, the amount of compensatory damages, and the deterrent effect);
Sulecki, 516 A.2d at 1220 (finding the nature of the conduct, the purpose of the award, an
appropriate punishment of the defendant, and the relationship to the compensatory dam-
age award to be relevant factors); Coale, 701 P.2d at 889 (finding relevant factors to be the
nature of the act, the defendant's economic status, and the deterrent effect).
Despite the uniformity in the various relevant factors, the courts seemed unable to de-
cide whether ratio was a relevant factor. Compare Keehr, 825 F.2d at 142 (stating that
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While courts considered various factors to determine if an award was
excessive, the use of these factors varied considerably.17 Some courts
simply stated the relevant factors and concluded whether these factors
justified the award.' In another case, a reviewing court examined the
trial court's application of the standards.8 9 Using this approach, the re-
viewing court must engage in a detailed application of the elements of the
test to the facts of each case as they appear in the trial record.90 Accord-
ingly, this method involved thorough scrutiny of all elements of a punitive
damage award, both legal and factual, to determine if it was excessive.
91
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EXCESSIVENESS STANDARDS
A. Supreme Court Recognition of Constitutional Protections
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of punitive
damages on many occasions.' Challenges to punitive damage awards
have focused on such constitutional concepts as double jeopardy, 93 free-
dom of speech and press,94 equal protection,95 and the excessive fines
punitive damages need not be "within a certain ratio to compensatory damages") and
Coale, 701 P.2d at 889 (finding that ratio is not "a factor to be considered in determining
the excessiveness of a punitive damages award") with Roberts, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (deter-
mining that the amount of compensatory damages is one factor for courts to consider) and
Sulecki, 516 A.2d at 1220 (holding that courts should consider ratio as a factor).
87. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing various applications of
these tests).
88. See Estate of Korf, 917 F.2d at 485 (finding the award reasonable); Coale, 701 P.2d
at 889 (finding that sufficient evidence supported the need for substantial punitive
damages).
89. See Sulecki, 516 A.2d at 1220-21 (finding that the trial court properly applied the
relevant factors in determining that remittitur was required).
90, See, e.g., Keehr, 825 F.2d at 142; Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 865-
66 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
91. See Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d at 865-66. Texas law requires courts to consider six
factors in determining whether a punitive damage award is reasonable: a reasonable pro-
portion to compensatory damages, the nature of the wrong, the character of the defend-
ant's conduct, the mental state of the wrongdoer, the respective positions of the parties
involved, and public policy issues based on offensiveness to public consciousness. Id. at
865. The Pennzoil court focused on "the type of action, the conduct involved, and the need
for deterrence" to determine that it should reduce the punitive damage award for tortious
interference with contract from three billion dollars to one billion dollars. Id. at 866.
Courts can use similar intense scrutiny to uphold an award. See Keehr, 825 F.2d at 142
(finding that the nature of the defendants' actions and their wealth justified the award).
92. See generally BLATr, supra note 2, § 2 (discussing the history of constitutional at-
tacks on punitive damages); 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3 (same).
93. See 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.02.
94. See id. § 3.04.
95. See id. § 3.05.
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clause.9 6 The Court, however, has given the most attention to due pro-
cess challenges to punitive damages.
1. Historical Background
Due process challenges must overcome the fact that punitive damages
have long been a part of the American legal system.97 In The Amiable
Nancy,9" the Supreme Court, indicating the importance of punitive dam-
ages to the legal system,99 held that punitive damages were appropriate
when the defendant's conduct rose to a level of egregiousness beyond
negligence.1 "° Four decades later, in Day v. Woodworth,' the Court
specifically addressed the constitutionality of punitive damages,' °2 finding
that the long tradition of punitive damages evidenced the "propriety" of
the "doctrine."'" Furthermore, the Court stressed that the decision to
award punitive damages was within the discretion of the jury."°4
When Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, it pro-
vided a new angle by which to attack punitive damages-due process of
law.105 In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,' ° the Court addressed
this aspect of punitive damages."° The Court noted that although there
are no rules to control jury discretion, the punitive damage remedy is
important and useful to the legal system.' °8 Thus, the Court concluded
96. See id § 3.06.
97. BLATr, supra note 2, § 2.3, at 19 (stating that "[plunitive damages are an en-
trenched part of the American legal tradition, and this fact has been a decided obstacle to
persuading the Supreme Court of the United States that constitutional limits on punitive
damages are required").
98. 16 U.S. 546 (1818).
99. Id at 558. A private, armed vessel detained the papers of the schooner Amiable
Nancy. Id at 546-49. As a result, Great Britain retained the ship. Id The owners of the
Amiable Nancy were awarded $15,000 in punitive damages against the owner of the pri-
vate vessel. Id The Court affirmed the award, indicating that punitive damages are appro-
priate to punish wrongdoers for gross misconduct. Id. at 558-59.
100. Id.
101. 54 U.S. 363 (1852).
102. See BLArr, supra note 2, § 2.3, at 21 (stating that Day v. Woodworth is "often
referred to as the Court's first decision on the constitutionality of punitive damages").
103. Day, 54 U.S. at 371. Day involved damages assessed against neighbors who tres-
passed on Mr. Day's land to lower his dam. Id. at 363. The Court indicated that although
many scholars had questioned the concept of punitive damages, punitive damages have
been a part of the law for over a century. Id at 371. That fact indicated that punitive
damages were appropriate and constitutional in certain cases. Id. at 371.
104. Id. (noting that the award depends on the unique facts of each case).
105. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885) (framing the issue as
whether the statute in question violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
106. 115 U.S. at 512.
107. Id. at 516-21.
108. Id. at 521. The Court noted that the awarding of punitive damages "'blends to-
gether the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and gives damages, not only
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that the punitive damage award did not exceed the limits imposed by the
Due Process Clause. 1°9
2. Modem Constitutional Approaches
Although the lack of successful due process attacks on punitive dam-
ages may have indicated that the Supreme Court had foreclosed such
challenges, 110 three decisions in the 1980s revealed that the Court was
willing to consider due process challenges to punitive damages."' In
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie," 2 the Court noted that the due pro-
cess issue required resolution, 113 but decided the case on other
grounds." 4 Similarly, in Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
115
the Court did not decide the due process issue," 6 but did indicate the
concern of several justices about the validity of such large punitive dam-
age awards. 1
17
to recompense the sufferer but to punish the offender.'" Id. (citations omitted). The
Court also noted that jury discretion "is not controlled by any very definite rules." Id.
(citations omitted).
109. Id. at 522.
110. See BLATr, supra note 2, § 2.5, a: 26 (stating that "[g]iven the historical failure of
Nineteenth Century challenges to the constitutionality of punitive damages, few believed
prior to 1986 that punitive damages would be held to be unconstitutional").
111. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (declining
to answer the question of whether due process is a limitation on punitive damages awards);
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (refusing to review a punitive
damages award, but focusing on penalty provisions); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. 813 (1986) (raising questions regarding excessive damages awards, but deciding the
case on other grounds).
112. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
113. Id at 828-29 (stating that although the appellant's Eighth Amendment and due
process arguments raised issues that must be resolved, the Court's decision on other issues
made it unnecessary to reach those issues).
114. Id at 829. This case involved an action for bad faith against an insurance carrier
against whom the jury assessed $1,378 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in puni-
tive damages. Id at 816. The Court reversed the award because of the failure of the trial
judge to recuse himself, making it unnecessary for the Court to address the constitutional
issues. Id. at 828.
115. 486 U.S. 71 (1988). The jury awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages and $1.6
million in punitive damages against the defendant-insurer for wrongful failure to pay medi-
cal benefits. Id. at 75.
116. Id. at 79-80 (refusing to review the constitutional argument because of the possi-
bility that the lower courts would resolve the issue).
117. See id. Most notably, Justice O'Connor indicated great concern about the consti-
tutionality of such a large punitive damage award. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the punitive character implicated the Due Process Clause
because the law grants a "wholly standardless discretion" to juries to award punitive dam-
ages in any tort case. Id at 88.
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The Court, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,118 fi-
nally addressed one constitutional issue regarding punitive damages-the
application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' 19
The Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to civil liti-
gation between private parties in which punitive damages were as-
sessed.'2 ° Although the Court once again declined to decide the due
process issue, the members of the Court explicitly noted that they would
be willing to consider the application of the Due Process Clause to puni-
tive damages in an appropriate case.' 2 ' Aetna Life, Banker's Life, and
Browning-Ferris indicated that the due process element of punitive dam-
ages was an open issue, 22 thus setting the stage for a decision resolving
the issue.
3. Haslip: Recognition of Due Process Protection
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,123 the Supreme Court
directly addressed the due process issue for the first time, establishing a
framework for evaluating whether an award satisfied constitutional re-
118. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
119. Id. at 259; see supra note 8 (providing the text of the Excessive Fines Clause)
120. Id.
121. Id. at 276-77. The Court indicated that it had not yet addressed the "precise ques-
tion presented here: whether due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award
punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit." Id. (citations omitted). In
his concurrence, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, explicitly indicated his belief
that the decision of the Court did not answer the due process question. Id. at 280 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Brennan concurred in the majority opinion with
"the understanding that [the majority opinion] leaves the door open for a holding that the
Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases." Id. Jus-
tice O'Connor also suggested that the door to address due process remained open. Id. at
283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She reiterated the same
concern that she expressed in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. that punitive damages in fact
may violate due process. Id.; see also Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S.
71, 86-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); supra note
117 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concerns as expressed in Bankers Life & Casualty Co.).
In addition, Justices Brennan and O'Connor indicated the course that they believed the
due process analysis would eventually take. Justice Brennan indicated his belief that the
Court should closely scrutinize a jury award of punitive damages made without reference
to any statutory guidelines. Browing-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 281. Similarly, Justice
O'Connor indicated that there may be a due process challenge to both the amount of the
award itself and the procedures used by courts to make the award, thereby laying the
framework for analysis of both substantive and procedural due process claims. See id. at
283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
123. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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quirements. 24 Haslip involved an insured's action against Pacific Mutual
for fraudulently failing to cover her medical expenses. 25 The jury
awarded $840,000 in punitive damages, 126 which the trial judge upheld
127
and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 28 Thereafter, Pacific Mutual
challenged the award on due process grounds because the trial court had
given the jury unlimited discretion.'29 Despite this challenge, the
Supreme Court found that the punitive damage award did not violate due
process. 13
0
In the majority opinion,' 3 ' Justice Blackmun first noted that while the
common law system of assessing punitive damages was not "per se uncon-
stitutional,"' 32 a particular award could be unconstitutional. 33 To make
this constitutional determination, the Court established a method of anal-
ysis that focused on both the procedures used to impose the award and
the reasonableness of the amount of the award.'3 4
124. See id at 12 (indicating that parties previously had brought constitutional chal-
lenges to punitive damages before the Court, but that the Court did not resolve those
issues).
125. I& at 4-6. Pacific Mutual's agent accepted payments for canceled insurance poli-
cies. Id. at 5. The plaintiff thus did not have valid insurance coverage and was personally
liable for medical bills that she was unable to pay. Id. A judgment against her for these
bills adversely affected her credit. Id. In her action against Pacific Mutual, she claimed
damages for fraud based on the agent's actions, and the trial court held Pacific Mutual
liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 6.
126. It. at 7 n.2. The jury did not specify the amount of punitive damages, although the
trial court found it likely that the amount was at least $840,000. Id.
127. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 533 So. 2d 537, 540 (Ala. 1989), aff'd,
499 U.S. 1 (1991). The appellate court noted that the trial judge refused to reduce the
award because the defendant's conduct was egregious. Id.
128. Id. (affirming the award of punitive damages).
129. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7. As a preliminary matter the Court held that imposing liabil-
ity based on respondeat superior did not violate due process. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 23-24 ("We conclude ... that in this case [the punitive damage award] does
not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." (footnote omitted)).
131. Id at 2. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id.
132. Id at 17-18. The majority reviewed cases that upheld the common law method of
imposing punitive damages. Id at 17. The Court noted that in each of these cases, the
reviewing court concluded that the common law system did not violate due process. Id.
The Court found that the historical acceptance of the common law system indicated that it
is not so unfair as to be inherently unconstitutional. Id. at 17-18.
133. Id at 18 (declaring that historical recognition of punitive damages does not pre-
clude finding them unconstitutional).
134. Id In the most frequently cited portion of the Haslip opinion, the Court stated
that "unlimited jury discretion ... may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities. We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between
the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable .... however ...
general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court ... properly
enter into the constitutional calculus." Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
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In evaluating the procedural aspects of the award, the Court examined
the jury instructions 135 and concluded that the jury's discretion, while sig-
nificant, was limited enough to satisfy due process."3 Moreover, the
Court found that Alabama's post-trial procedures for reviewing punitive
damage awards ensured meaningful review of the award at both the trial
and appellate levels.' 37 Thus, the Court determined that the existing judi-
cial procedures sufficiently limited jury discretion 138 and that Pacific Mu-
tual received sufficient procedural due process protections.'
39
The Court also briefly analyzed the reasonableness of the award,"4
noting that the punitive damages were more than four times greater than
the compensatory damages.' 4' Nevertheless, the Court did not find that
this ratio rendered the award unconstitutional. 42 The Court's decision
established a precedent for examining the substantive reasonableness by
comparing punitive and actual damages.'
43
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority opinion and agreed that jury
assessment of punitive damages was an accepted part of the legal sys-
tem'" that satisfied due process.' 45 Justice Kennedy also concurred, not-
135. See id. at 6 n.1. The judge instructed the jury that if it found that the defendant
committed fraud, it should award punitive damages to punish and deter the defendant by
imposing an amount that is based on "the character and the degree of the wrong as shown
by. the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." Id.
136. Id. at 19. The Court found that the charge limited the jury's discretion because it
directed the jury to focus on deterrence and retribution. Id. at 19-20. The instructions
fully informed the jury as to whether it should impose punitive damages at all and also
gave the jury guidance regarding the amount of punitive damages to impose. Id. Accord-
ingly, the instructions both advanced the state's interest in punishing and deterring the
defendant, while giving Pacific Mutual the benefit of a rational decision. Id. These facts
led to the conclusion that the jury exercised its discretion "within reasonable constraints,"
thus meeting the due process requirements. Id. at 20.
137. Id. at 20-23. The trial court procedure required that the judge state on the record
his or her reasons for upholding or reducing an award, such as the culpability of the de-
fendant's conduct, the deterrent effect, the impact on the parties, and other unspecified
factors. Id. at 20.
138. Id. at 20-21. The Court indicated that Alabama first "undertakes a comparative
analysis," and then applies the "detailed substantive standards it has developed for evalu-
ating punitive awards." Id. at 21. The Court also noted seven factors that Alabama con-
siders in evaluating an award to provide further assurance that the award is proportionate
to the severity of the conduct and is reasonably related to actual damages. Id. at 22.
139. Id. at 18-23.




144. Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 38-40; see also id at 24. It is traditional to leave the punitive damage deci-
sion to the jury's discretion and doing so does not violate the Bill of Rights; thus, there
cannot be a due process violation. Id. at 24-40. Justice Scalia would have approved the
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ing that the concept of punitive damages was so integral a part of legal
tradition that it would be nearly impossible to find this remedy unfair."4
Justice O'Connor dissented, however, finding that unlimited jury discre-
tion in the common-law system did not provide the meaningful standards
that the Due Process Clause demanded. 47
Haslip clearly established that there were due process limits to punitive
damages.'" It also established a framework for determining whether an
award satisfied the requirements of due process. 49 When faced with con-
stitutional challenges to punitive damages awards, lower courts were left
with the task of amending their standards of excessiveness to fit the newly
announced constitutional framework.'5 0
B. The Modification of State Excessiveness Standards to Comply with
Due Process
The Haslip decision demonstrated that a jury's imposition of a large
punitive damage award does not violate due process per se.' 5 ' However,
challenged procedure without further inquiry into its " 'fairness' " or " 'reasonableness.'"
Id at 24-25.
146. Id at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy found that "[j]ury determina-
tion of punitive damages has such long and principled recognition as a central part of our
system that no further evidence of its essential fairness or rationality ought to be deemed
necessary." Id However, he questioned the soundness of the majority's approach, as it
did not specify how a common law award of punitive damages would violate due process.
Id Instead, Justice Kennedy would apply further due process scrutiny only when a "biased
or prejudiced jury" returned a verdict, as evidenced by the "extreme amount of an award
compared to the actual damage inflicted." Id. at 42. In a prophetic statement, Justice
Kennedy noted that the incomplete nature of the Haslip decision would require the Court
to examine these issues again. Id at 42.
147. Id at 42-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor continued to stress the
need for clear standards to limit jury discretion. Id She reasoned that only through clear
standards can a court ensure that the jury acts reasonably, and therefore protect the de-
fendant's constitutional rights. Id. Justice O'Connor faulted the jury instruction because
of its ambiguity in explaining how to compute the amount of punitive damages. Id 48-49.
"Due process may not require a detailed roadmap, but it certainly requires directions of
some sort." Id at 49. In reaching this conclusion, Justice O'Connor focused on the proce-
dural nature of due process, concluding that it would not burden the plaintiff or the state to
impose an additional procedural safeguard of increased constraint on jury discretion. See
id. at 53-60.
148. While Haslip does not specifically discuss procedural and substantive due process
separately, it is beneficial to separate the elements of the case that relate to each concept.
See May, supra note 2, at 587-88.
149. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
150. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
Haslip).
151. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; see also BLATr, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that Haslip's
"seven to one majority decision appears at a minimum, to settle one issue, namely that
large punitive damages awards do not constitute a per se violation" of due process).
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Haslip left many constitutional questions regarding punitive damages un-
answered, and, as a result, encouraged defendants to challenge state puni-
tive damage award procedures.'52 As courts delineated the requirements
of due process in a punitive damages context, they created a wide range
of standards. 53
1. General Reasonableness Tests
Many courts cited Haslip only for the proposition that punitive dam-
ages are constitutional, and continued to employ the standard of reasona-
bleness that they already had defined. 54 After considering several
factors, including deterrence, 55 the potential damage of the defendant's
actions, 56 and the defendant's wealth, 57 these courts found that their
excessiveness tests satisfied due process as defined in Haslip158
152. See BLATr, supra note 2, at 35; May, supra note 2, at 586-87 (indicating that Has-
lip does not preclude due process attacks on punitive damages).
153. The Haslip decision caused courts to reconsider their procedures for assessing and
reviewing punitive damages. See 1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 3.03 (Supp.
1993). Courts were very unclear as to the requirements of procedural due process. BLATr,
supra note 2, at 45-46. The result is that "the outcome of the struggle over the constitu-
tionality of punitive damages is likely to vary dramatically from state to state and from
issue to issue for many years to come." Id. at 53.
154. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 926, 946 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (finding that due process only requires meaningful limits on jury discretion), rev'd on
other grounds, 881 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1994); Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 811
S.W.2d 251, 263 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (citing, without analysis, Haslip as indicating- that
punitive damages violate neither due process nor public policy), rev'd on other grounds,
839 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1992); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790, 792 (Nev. 1991)
(finding the defendant's constitutional argument meritless because all courts accepted pu-
nitive damages as part of the legal process).
155. See Browning-Ferris, 845 S.W.2d at 945-46 (finding that the jury instruction prop-
erly limited the jury's discretion because it identified the purposes of punitive damages);
Bard, 811 S.W.2d at 263 (affirming an award to deter the defendant from committing fu-
ture wrongful acts, regardless of the defendant's ability to pay or even the plaintiff's ability
to collect the judgment).
156. Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501, 502-03 (Ga. 1991) (finding that the use of
deterrence as a basis for a punitive damage avard requires an analysis of several factors
and therefore is a constitutional approach), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992).
157. See, e.g., Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Cal. 1991) (finding that in
determining whether an award is excessive, the court must consider what amount would
deter and punish the defendant in light of the defendant's net worth); American Medical
Int'l, Inc. v. Scheller, 590 So. 2d 947, 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that punitive
damages should be based, in part, on the defendant's wealth to deter him and others from
similar future conduct) (citing Lassitter v. International Union of Op. Eng'rs., 349 So. 2d
622, 626 (Fla. 1976)).
158. See Bard, 811 S.W.2d at 263; Republic, 810 P.2d at 793 (finding that despite Re-
public's oppressive behavior, an award of $22.5 million in punitive damages clearly ex-
ceeded what was required to deter the defendant).
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By considering several factors in determining the size of punitive dam-
ages awards, courts satisfied the constitutional mandate that the award be
reasonable. 59 Consequently, a constitutional principle developed
whereby courts did not have to consider any particular factors as long as
they reviewed some factors in evaluating the reasonableness of the
award. 160
2. Procedural Focus
Other courts interpreted Haslip simply to require that they use fair
procedures to assess punitive damages, rather than an independent evalu-
ation of reasonableness. 161 These courts established procedures that they
believed satisfied due process' 62 by mimicking Haslip's three procedural
elements: constrained jury discretion, meaningful trial court review, and
meaningful appellate review.
163
Courts could limit jury discretion sufficiently by instructing the jury to
consider various factors when awarding punitive damages."6 These fac-
tors included the degree of recklessness of the defendant, the punishment
and deterrence purposes of the award, the actual damages, and the de-
fendant's ability to pay.' 65 Regardless of the particular factors selected,
courts satisfied due process if they provided a meaningful constraint on
jury discretion."6
159. See supra notes 154-58 (discussing means used to constrain jury discretion and,
thus, satisfy due process).160. See Jones, 409 S.E.2d at 503 (stating that "Haslip analyzed the punitive damages
award by comparing it to the actual award, [but] nothing in the opinion mandates such a
comparison").
161. See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991).
162. Id
163. See id at 908 (finding that to comport with Haslip, courts must provide "(1) a
reasonable constraint on jury discretion; (2) a meaningful and adequate review by the trial
court using well-established principles; and (3) a meaningful and adequate appellate
review").
164. See id. at 909 (establishing five factors about which the court should instruct the
jury); Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 355 (S.C. 1991) (listing eight factors the jury
should consider). Courts require that the jury consider specific factors in an effort to better
define the general concepts that are the basis for punitive damage awards. See Transporta-
tion Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814 S.W.2d 144, 149-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that factors
guide the jury in determining what is a reasonable proportion between punitive and actual
damages), rev'd on other grounds, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
165. Gamble, 406 S.E.2d at 354. The factors the jury considers will vary with the partic-
ular jurisdiction. See supra note 164 (discussing how courts apply the various factors).
166. Courts have found that the jury instructions do not need to follow the Haslip in-
struction exactly, as long as the instruction significantly controls jury discretion. See Wolf
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 808 S.W.2d 868,874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the
instruction was adequate because it was similar to Haslip, at least in effect if not in con-
tent); Heideman v. American Family Ins. Group, 473 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
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Trial courts used standards of review that varied significantly. 167
Under an abuse of discretion standard,"6 a court would overturn only
those awards that were clearly excessive. 69 Other courts required in-
dependent trial court review 170 or contemplated factors in addition to
those that the jury considered.' 7 ' When the trial court did not adhere to
the established procedures, the award presumptively violated due
process.
72
Finally, Haslip required appellate court review of the award. 173 The
standards of appellate review, like trial court review, ranged from the
traditional abuse of discretion standard 74 to a more detailed review of all
of the relevant factors that the lower courts had analyzed.' 75 The appel-
(finding that although the court's instruction allowed the jury significant discretion, the
purpose of punitive damages sufficiently limited the jury and, thus, satisfied due process).
Conversely, when the instruction did not adequately limit jury discretion, courts held that
the jury's imposition of punitive damages violated due process and reversed the award.
See Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that an
instruction to "enter punitive damages in such 'sum as you believe' will punish and deter"
failed to limit jury discretion in any way and violated due process).
167. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing different standards of
trial court review).
168. See Wolf, 808 S.W.2d at 874.
169. See id The court found that trial court review should focus on the relationship
between the degree of malice, as the evidence established, and the amount of the award.
Id The court determined that it would use an abuse of discretion framework. Id This
test required the court to reverse the award when it was disproportionate to the degree of
malice, as indicated by all the facts and circumstances. Id.
170. See MGW, Inc. v. Fredricks Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 896 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 441 (1993). The trial court review is independent. Id This
allows the trial judge to consider all of the evidence, including the credibility of the wit-
nesses. Id. Further, the trial judge could make any necessary inferences, even if contradic-
tory to those made by the jury, to find the award unreasonable. Id.
171. See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991). One court
added additional factors for the trial judge to consider. Id These factors included court
costs, potential criminal liability of the defendant, other civil liability of the defendant, and
the award's effect in encouraging settlements. Id. However, in considering the trial court's
review of the award, the appellate court found that the jury should not consider such fac-
tors because they are highly prejudicial. Id As a further procedural safeguard, other
courts required the trial judge to state on the record reasons for upholding the award. See
Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (S.C. 1991).
172. See American Employers Ins. Co. v. Southern Seeding Servs., Inc., 931 F.2d 1453,
1458 (11th Cir. 1991) (remanding the case for a trial court determination of whether the
award was proper because the trial court failed to state on the record its consideration of
the relevant factors).
173. See Gamble, 406 S.E.2d at 353-54; supra note 137 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the majority opinion in Haslip).
174. Gamble, 406 S.E.2d at 355.
175. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 910.
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late courts followed the general principle that the judicial review satisfied
due process if it was "objective and meaningful."'17 6
In evaluating whether any single procedural aspect was sufficient,
courts analyzed the totality of the procedural aspects. 177 Even when one
aspect appeared suspect, courts found that the analysis satisfied due pro-
cess if other procedural protections remedied the deficiency. 78 If the
procedures as a whole met the requirements of "'reasonableness' and
'adequate guidance to the jury,'" they satisfied the constitutional proce-
dural requirements.'
79
Under an approach that focused on Haslip's procedural requirements,
an award was constitutional when a trial court followed established pro-
cedures.l s° Conversely, an appellate court could find that an award was
unreasonable and reverse it when the trial court did not follow the estab-
lished procedures.181 Although this type of approach emphasized proce-
dural aspects, it also forced the trial judge to consider various factors,
resulting in a substantive determination of the constitutionality of a par-
176. See MGW, Inc. v. Fredericks Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 897 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 441 (1993).
177. See Wolf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 808 S.W.2d 868, 874 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) (determining that there was no violation of due process after reviewing both the trial
court's instruction and the sufficiency of the trial court's post-verdict review); Heideman v.
American Family Ins. Group, 473 N.W.2d 14,23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the trial
judge's instruction concerning the purposes of punitive damages properly limited the jury's
discretion, thereby satisfying due process).
178. Heideman, 473 N.W.2d at 23. For example, jury instructions that did not ade-
quately limit discretion violated due process when the review procedure was not sufficient
to protect against unbridled jury discretion. Cf. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d
1408, 1415 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the minimal trial and appellate review did not
remedy the standardless discretion that the court allowed the jury); Mattison v. Dallas
Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding the procedures unsatisfactory
because neither the instruction to "the jury to enter punitive damages in such 'sum as you
believe' will punish and deter" nor the trial court review under an excessiveness standard
provided adequate standards to guide the award of punitive damages).
179. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 537 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216 (1994); see also Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946
F.2d 1085, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that although the procedures differed from those
that the Court analyzed in Haslip, they still could be acceptable so long as they met the
general requirement of limited jury discretion and adequate post-trial review), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992).
180. See, e.g., Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38,49 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
court already concluded that the Texas procedures regarding punitive damages satisfied
due process, so the only inquiry was whether the court followed these procedures in the
instant case).
181. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (indicating that in American Employ-
ers, the court reversed a punitive damage award because the trial court failed to follow
established procedures).
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ticular award.'" Furthermore, in reviewing the award, the appellate
court analyzed and dissected the elements of each factor, providing an
additional substantive test of reasonableness.'1 3 Thus, while these courts
appear to have focused on procedural elements, they actually afforded
some substantive protection to punitive damage defendants.
3. Procedural and Reasonableness Test
A third line of cases established a two-prong test in which courts ana-
lyzed the procedures used to impose punitive damages and conducted a
separate substantive evaluation of the reasonableness of the award."8
These courts interpreted Haslip to require this type of analysis." 5
Courts met the procedural requirements if there were meaningful pro-
tections against an award that resulted from improper responses by the
jury.'" Courts satisfied the substantive test if any factor supported the
size of the award."8 This fact-intensive inquiry was based on various fac-
tors that the court determined essential to the constitutional test, rather
than on the abstract amount of an award.1
88
182. See supra note 171 (indicating the substantive nature of trial court review in
Games).
183. Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 471 N.W.2d 670, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(considering the factors required by statute in the appellate court's analysis of the award to
determine that the award was excessive and that the trial court did not properly apply the
factors). California courts have determined that their procedures are constitutional, but
when the trial court does not consider the defendant's net worth in determining the reason-
ableness of the award, the court has applied the procedures incorrectly. See Wollersheim, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545 (finding that a punitive damages award that represents 150% of the
defendant's net worth is clearly excessive and must be reduced).
184. See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 596 A.2d 687,
710 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (stating that when "faced with a punitive award that was
entered upon proper procedure but which nonetheless contravenes due process because it
is out of all proportion to both the harm caused and the perniciousness of the conduct," the
court must find the award unconstitutional), cert. granted, 627 A.2d 1063 (Md. 1993).
185. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1991)
(stating that "after Haslip, an award of punitive damages is constitutional if the circum-
stances of the case indicate that the award is reasonable and the procedure used in assess-
ing and reviewing the award imposes a sufficiently definite ... constraint on the discretion
of the factfinder" (emphasis added)).
186. Id. at 1385. The court determined that the instructions to the jury regarding the
policies of deterrence and retribution sufficiently limited the jury's discretion, and, coupled
with meaningful appellate review, met the requirements of procedural due process. Id. at
1385-86.
187. Id. The court determined that the egregious conduct and corporate wealth of the
defendant supported the reasonableness of the punitive damage award. Id. at 1382.
188. Id. at 1382; see also Capstick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 810, 818 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying both a procedural and reasonableness analysis to determine that the award was
proper); Broadcort Capital Corp. v. Summa Medical Corp., 972 F.2d 1183, 1193-94 (10th
Cir. 1992) (same); Market Tavern, Inc. v. Bowen, 610 A.2d 295, 304 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992) (same).
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The result of this two-prong approach was that a court could find an
award unconstitutional simply because the award appeared excessive,
even if the procedures were satisfactory.'" 9 This approach clearly exem-
plified the potential ramifications of the Haslip decision. Rather than
adapting Haslip to existing tests of reasonableness, or evaluating proce-
dures used in awarding punitive damages, this two-prong approach at-
tempted to achieve both goals. 190 Thus, when courts assessed punitive
damages against defendants in these jurisdictions, the defendants had two
independent methods for challenging the award.' 91 These defendants re-
ceived the full panoply of constitutional protection that the Supreme
Court announced in Haslip.
Although Haslip established a framework for analyzing punitive dam-
ages on a constitutional basis, courts interpreted it differently and, as a
result, the application of due process concepts to this context varied
greatly."9 This lack of uniformity led to the Supreme Court's decision in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., a decision that many
anticipated would address the questions that Haslip left unanswered.
III. TXO PRODUCTION CORP. V. ALLIANCE RESOURCES CORP.:
LACKING A MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF DUE PROCESS
A. The Plurality: Reasonableness Based on Potential Harm
The plurality in TXO began by affirming several key principles from
Haslip, including the concepts that a punitive damage award may violate
due process if it is grossly excessive, 93 and that the Court cannot create
189. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 604-05 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that although adequate procedures protected the defendant's due pro-
cess rights, the award was excessive in light of a lack of sufficient evidentiary support);
Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 596 A.2d 687, 710-11 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding that although the court followed proper procedures, the
punitive damage award was nonetheless excessive in amount), cert. granted, 627 A.2d 1063
(1993); see also Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1067-70 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(same).
190. See Fraidin, 611 A.2d at 1067-70; Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 604-05; Alexander & Al-
exander, 596 A.2d at 710-11.
191. See Fraidin, 611 A.2d at 1067-70; Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 604-05; Alexander & Al-
exander, 596 A.2d at 710-11; see also supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing
two avenues that the defendant may pursue in challenging award).
192. See supra notes 154-91 and accompanying text (discussing three categories of re-
sponses to Haslip).
193. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993). The
plurality acknowledged that "TXO correctly point[ed] out that several of our opinions
have stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substan-
tive limits 'beyond which penalties may not go.'" Id. (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v.
Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). Alliance also agreed that due process imposed a substan-
tive limit on the punitive damage award. Id. at 2719.
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an objective test to determine excessiveness.'94 Accordingly, the plural-
ity held that courts should only contemplate general concerns for reason-
ableness to determine if an award violated due process.' 9
In TXO, the Court reiterated its requirement that punitive damages
bear some "'reasonable relationship to compensatory damages.' ,196
This relationship, however, remains only one relevant factor.' 97 The
Supreme Court indicated that courts also may consider the potential
harm resulting from the defendant's actions.198 The Supreme Court con-
sidered the potential monetary harm of TXO's conduct-the amount that
TXO potentially could have gained from its fraudulent scheme-rather
than the actual damages awarded. 199 When viewed in this light, the dis-
parity between the actual and punitive damages did not appear to be as
194. Id at 2720. The Court affirmed its position in Haslip that it cannot create a bright
line test for evaluating a punitive damage award. Id Accordingly, the plurality rejected
TXO's "objective" test for examining the fairness of an award. Id at 2719. TXO sug-
gested that the court examine several objective criteria to determine whether the award
was excessive, such as comparing the award to other punitive damage awards for similar
actions. lt TXO submitted that if this comparison revealed that the award was excessive,
the Court should deem the award to be unconstitutional, unless there was a compelling
interest supporting such an award. Id TXO concluded that its punishment was clearly
irrational when compared to other awards. Id. at 2719 n.22. The Court also rejected
TXO's contention that strict scrutiny applied because the award was made without statu-
tory guidance. Id at 2719-20.
The Court noted that objective criteria may be useful in certain cases, but should not be
the sole basis for assessing the constitutionality of an award. Id at 2720. The Court indi-
cated that a comparison to other awards may be a relevant factor. Id. However, the Court
was hesitant to hold that courts should consider comparisons as an objective measurement
in every case. hd Thus, the Court felt that it could not create a single "test" to evaluate
whether an award was constitutional. IR
195. Id. at 2720. The Court adopted a test that reflected a "general concer[n] of reason-
ableness" to evaluate if a large punitive damage award violates substantive due process.
IcL (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (alterations in origi-
nal)). Moreover, the Court noted that an award may be unreasonable, but may not neces-
sarily violate due process. See id. at 2720 n.24. To violate due process the award must be
both unreasonable and "'grossly excessive.'" Id
196. Id. at 2721 (quoting Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d., 897, 909 (W. Va.
1991)).
197. Id. at 2721 (stating that the courts have declined to adopt approaches which focus
entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive damages).
198. Id The Court stated that consideration of the potential harm is consistent with
Haslip. Id. at 2721. Potential harm is harm that the plaintiff would have suffered if the
defendant had succeeded, as well as the possible harm that other victims could have suf-
fered if the defendant had acted in a similar manner against others. Id at 2722.
199. Id. The Court cited the determination of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia that TXO's behavior could have caused millions of dollars in damages, and could
have deprived Alliance of revenues ranging from $5 to $8.3 million. Id
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severe. 200 This fact led the Court to conclude that the award was not
unconstitutionally excessive.
201
From a procedural perspective, the Court did not address the adequacy
of the jury instruction.2 2 The Court did acknowledge that the instruc-
tions emphasized the defendant's wealth and noted that although wealth
is a permissible factor to consider, its mention creates a risk of jury preju-
dice against large corporations.2 3 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
trial and appellate court review was sufficient,204 and, accordingly, that
the procedures satisfied due process.
2 5
B. The Concurring Opinions: Reasonableness Based on Malice and
Traditional Procedures
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality's assessment that the proce-
dural aspects of the award satisfied due process.21 However, he dis-
agreed with the plurality's "reasonableness" evaluation.20 7 Justice
Kennedy preferred only to analyze the jury's reasons for imposing the
award. 208 He concluded that potential harm could not support the puni-
tive damage award against TXO because Alliance did not present evi-
dence of potential harm to the jury.2°
Justice Kennedy advocated alternatively to affirm the verdict based on
TXO's malice, a factor that Alliance presented to the jury.210 The jury
200. Id The Court stated that in a case of this character, the disparity between actual
and compensatory damages is not controlling. Id. This resulted from the fact that in this
case, the actual damages did not represent the full measure of the harm that TXO's con-
duct could have caused. Id.
201. 1d
202. The Court did not address this issue because the defendants did not properly pres-
ent it to the state supreme court. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. The Court found that TXO did have an adequate hearing on its post-verdict
motions, and that the trial judge did state that he agreed with the jury's finding of exces-
siveness. Id The fact that the trial judge did not state his reasons for denying TXO's
motions on the record did not constitute a constitutional violation. Id
205. Id
206. Id at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Id at 2724-25 (stating that "[t]o ask whether a particular award of punitive dam-
ages is grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to what? ... [w]e are still
bereft of any standard").
208. Id. at 2725. Justice Kennedy believed that a more useful constitutional inquiry
would focus on the jury's reasons for making an award, thereby allowing for less conjecture
on the part of the reviewing court. Id An award clearly based on improper motives vio-
lates due process regardless of its size or the nature of the defendant's conduct. Id
209. Id at 2725.
210. Id at 2726. Justice Kennedy found that the record adequately supported a show-
ing of TXO's malice, and that the courts below had relied upon TXO's malice to justify the
award. Id
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properly could have decided that TXO's "deliberate, wrongful conduct"
required a large award to punish TXO and to deter TXO from similar
future conduct. 211 Thus, Justice Kennedy asserted that the award was
neither irrational nor unfair and, therefore, it satisfied due process.212
Justice Scalia also concurred, but did not inquire into the substantive
"reasonableness" of the punitive damage award.213 Rather, Justice Scalia
focused on the procedures that the lower courts utilized.214 In his view,
the Court should only "assure that due process (i.e., traditional proce-
dure) has been observed. '215 Once the Court made that determination,
the award was constitutional and the Court need not make any further
inquiry.
216
C. The O'Connor Dissent: A Substantively and Procedurally
Unreasonable Award
Justice O'Connor dissented from the plurality on both substantive and
procedural grounds. 217 In finding that the award was substantively defec-
tive, Justice O'Connor emphasized the need for courts to consider objec-
tive criteria in evaluating punitive damages, especially where, as in the
instant case, the award was grossly disproportionate to the actual dam-
ages. 218 She found that the proper objective factors for the Court to con-
sider in this case included prior awards in West Virginia219 and the
criminal and civil penalties for similar offenses. 2 0 Justice O'Connor re-
viewed these objective criteria and determined that the award was uncon-
stitutional because it was grossly disproportionate to the degree of TXO's
211. Id. at 2726.
212. Id.
213. I& at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia simply believed that the pro-
cedures were an accepted part of the legal landscape, and if the court followed those proce-
dures the award was constitutional. Id.
214. Id. at 2727.
215. Id. (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 2728, 2731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (dissenting because "neither this
award's size nor the procedures that produced it are consistent with the principles this
Court articulated in Haslip").
218. Id. at 2732. Justice O'Connor reflected on the traditional practice of judicial inter-
vention when an award appears to be the result of the jury's consideration of improper
factors. See id. at 2728-31. She determined that when the "verdict discloses such great
disproportions as to suggest the possibility of bias, caprice, or passion," courts must con-
sider more than subjective criteria to determine whether the award is excessive. Idt at
2732.
219. Id. at 2732-33. Justice O'Connor stressed that the award was 20 times larger than
any punitive damage award ever upheld in West Virginia. Id. at 2733.
220. I1&
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wrongful conduct and to the amount of actual damages that Alliance
suffered.2 1
Moreover, Justice O'Connor cited two reasons for disagreeing with the
Court's use of potential harm to support a finding of reasonableness.2 "
First, she did not find any evidence in the record to support any estimate
of potential harm.223 Second, she concluded that even with evidence of
potential harm, the jury in TXO could not have relied upon potential
harm to award punitive damages.2' Potential harm was neither in the
court's instructions to the jury, nor introduced into evidence, nor argued
at trial.' Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that potential harm was an
"after-the-fact" justification that the plaintiff's counsel used to support
the validity of the award.226 Moreover, she asserted, the critical question
was whether the jury based its decision on an impermissible factor, a
question left unanswered by the Court's analysis of potential harm.227
Justice O'Connor then considered procedural due process and con-
tended that the state court's review of the award in TXO was not consti-
tutionally sufficient.228 First, she found the trial court's summary disposal
of TXO's motions to be an inadequate form of review. 22 9 Second, she
noted that the appellate court had focused simply on TXO's malicious
221. Id. Justice O'Connor recognized that there are limits to her approach, but she
insisted that the Court mandate objective criteria. Id. Furthermore, she asserted that the
Supreme Court had proposed this approach in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Dispo-
sa4 Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989), and that common law courts also have used it in various
cases. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2733-34. Despite its limitations, this analysis revealed that the
award against TXO was not a proper response to its actions. Id. at 2734.
222. Id. Justice O'Connor accepted the concept of potential harm as a valid basis for
punitive damages, but in this case, she did not find the concept applicable. Id.
223. Id at 2734-35 (finding that, based upon the trial court record, evidence of poten-
tial harm was uncertain and almost nonexistent, and that the limited evidence only showed
the estimates to be exaggerated).
224. Id. at 2735.
225. Id. at 2734. Justice O'Connor asserted that "the potential harm theory is little
more than an after-the-fact rationalization invented by counsel to defend this startling
award on appeal." Id.
226. Id. Justice O'Connor cited the "fact that TXO is a very large, out-of-state corpora-
tion" as the basis for the jury's verdict. Id. at 2736. This conclusion extends from the
general nature of jury reaction to wealthy corporate defendants and from the evidence
presented to the TXO jury. Id. at 2736-39. Justice O'Connor stated that as a result of the
undue influence of TXO's wealth and foreign status, the jury based the award on its con-
sideration of impermissible factors, and thus the award violated due process. Id at 2739.
227. See id. at 2735-36 (discussing the course of the trial, which indicated that no aspect
of potential harm was presented to the jury).
228. Id. at 2740. ("Because the review afforded TXO was insufficient to conform with
the criteria this Court approved in Haslip, the case at least should be remanded for consti-
tutionally adequate post-verdict review.").
229. I& at 2740-42 (noting the inadequacy of the trial court's review of the jury's
award).
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behavior in concluding that there should not be a limit on the ratio be-
tween the punitive damages and the actual damages for a defendant with
TXO's character.2 3° This appellate review, like the trial court's review,
failed to satisfy the mandates of Haslip.231
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER TXO: AN EMPTY FRAMEWORK OF
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
A. Blurring Due Process Standards
The Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence indicated that
there are both procedural and substantive limits on punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause.232 Despite this realization, many ques-
tions about the elements of the due process equation remained un-
resolved.233 As a result, litigation challenging punitive damage awards on
due process grounds ensued, but failed to define any clear constitutional
standard.2-' When the Court granted certiorari to review TXO, many
commentators believed that the Court sought to clarify the contours of
the due process standard:235 Unfortunately, the Court failed in this task
230. Id. at 2741. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia categorized TXO's
behavior as "'really mean.'" Id.
231. Id. ("Because I believe that such cursory review is inconsistent with this Court's
decision in Haslip, I cannot join my colleagues in affirming.").
232. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2343 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (indicating that Haslip and TXO found that due process limits punitive damages). In
Honda, decided after TXO, the Supreme Court focused exclusively on a procedural ques-
tion: whether Oregon may constitutionally prohibit judicial review of a punitive damage
award. Id. at 2334-35. The Court specifically refused to address "the character of the
standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards" and focused only on proce-
dural elements. Id. at 2335. In determining the constitutionality of the award, the Court
compared the Oregon system to the traditional common law system and concluded that
Oregon's system violated due process. Id. at 2335-42.
TXO remains the Court's most recent complete statement on punitive damages because
Honda failed to address substantive due process and also left many procedural questions
unanswered. See generally id. at 2334-42 (majority opinion). This Note discusses Honda
only when it is illustrative of certain arguments.
233. See BLAT-r, supra note 2, at 35; Riggs, supra note 6, at 860 (indicating that in
Haslip, the Court had the opportunity to announce due process limits, but failed to provide
any "helpful guidelines for the future"); Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1367 (stating
that Haslip established that due process places limitations on punitive damages but failed
to "express those limitations with precision").
234. Riggs, supra note 6, at 865 (indicating that Haslip failed to set any helpful guide-
lines, and thus is "a prescription for ad hoc, case by case review of court procedures and
the size of awards to determine the reasonableness of punitive damages").
235. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1367, 1385 (reasoning that the Court's deci-
sion to review TXO indicated that it was concerned about punitive damages and the lack
of appropriate standards for their review and hoping that TXO would provide constitu-
tional guidelines for courts in awarding punitive damages); see Michael Rustad, In Defense
of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
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because it did not define methods to determine how to satisfy each ele-
ment of due process.23 6 TXO has created only more uncertainty as to the
constitutional scope of protection against excessive punitive damages.
2 37
In fact, under TXO, defendants have less constitutional protection
against excessive punitive damages because the TXO Court failed to de-
lineate any clear standards.
238
1. The End of Any Real Substantive Protection
In TXO, the Court explicitly recognized that there are substantive due
process protections against excessive punitive damages.239 This language
suggests that the TXO Court sought to expand the constitutional protec-
tions against punitive damages.' In actuality, however, the analysis in-
dicated the opposite: the Court applied a minimal level of scrutiny to
determine whether the lower courts had provided this substantive safe-
guard, thereby conferring very little protection.24'
The TXO plurality was dissatisfied with both the heightened scrutiny
that TXO requested and the rational basis standard that Alliance sug-
gested. 42 Instead, the Court employed a general test of reasonable-
IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (stating that TXO "is an opportunity for the Court to determine
the point at which punitive damages cross the line into constitutional impropriety violating
principles first articulated in [Haslip]").
236. See Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tager, Punitive Damages, the Constitution, and
Due Process, TiE RECORDER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 8 (indicating that if any of the key ele-
ments in TXO are missing, there is no standard for determining whether the constitution
has been satisfied); see also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2343 (1994) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (indicating that neither Haslip nor TXO "declared any specific proce-
dures or substantive criteria essential to satisfy due process").
237. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2731 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality for choosing "no course at all"). Profes-
sor Riggs succinctly summarized Haslip by stating that "[in future litigation the Court's
opinion will not be very helpful in resolving the constitutional issues." Riggs, supra note 6,
at 867. The TXO opinion features the same weakness. See Thomas R. Newman & Steven
J. Ahmuty, Jr., Review of Punitive Damages-IV, N.Y.L., Sept. 1, 1993, at 3 (stating that
for those who thought TXO would "establish uniform constitutional requirements for pu-
nitive damages awards, the resultant decision was surely a disappointment").
238. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2742 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
239. See id at 2718 (indicating that TXO was correct in stating that due process invokes
substantive limits on punitive damages); see also Riggs, supra note 6, at 877 n.72 (stating
that Haslip "saw due process implicated by the size of a punitive damages award but did
not specifically invoke substantive due process").
240. Compare TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2742 with Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18, 23-24 (1991) (addressing in general the reasonableness of the award, but not
explicitly recognizing the element of substantive due process).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 243-59 (discussing the reasonableness test).
242. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719-20.
Catholic University Law Review
ness.243 In TXO, the Court found support for the reasonableness of the
award by making a subjective determination of the potential harm of
TXO's actions. 2' The Court refused to accept TXO's argument that it
should uphold the award based on objective criteria.24 By ignoring ob-
jective criteria in its substantive due process evaluation, the Court ulti-
mately employed the lowest possible level of scrutiny.24
Courts previously had rejected this approach to evaluating reasonable-
ness because they had found that it did not satisfy due process. 247 These
courts determined that the use of subjective standards did not yield any
meaningful substantive due process protection against unreasonable pu-
nitive damage awards.24 8 After TXO, each court that uses the plurality's
method merely will examine the award based on its own subjective point
of view.2 49 Such an approach represents a retreat from the post-Haslip
development of the use of objective criteria in determining whether an
award is reasonable.250
Any one of a variety of rationales may support the plurality's decision
to employ such minimal scrutiny.251 Arguably, there is no constitutional
mandate for strict scrutiny in punitive damages cases. 252 Further, the
state standards of excessiveness ultimately may protect constitutional
rights, which would make an inquiry into substantive due process unnec-
243. Id. at 2720 (stating that the applicable test involves "'general concer[n] of reason-
ableness' .. . properly enter[ing] into the constitutional calculus'" (alterations in original)
(quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18)).
244. Id. at 2721-22.
245. See id. at 2720 (indicating that TXO's objective criteria were not sufficient to as-
sess the constitutionality of punitive damages). This approach is unlike the approach in
Haslip where the court, focusing on an objective relationship between actual and punitive
damages, upheld the award. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24.
246. Under a system of analysis that does not include the consideration of objective
factors, practitioners only can speculate as to whether a court will find that an award vio-
lates substantive due process. May, supra note 2, at 612; see also TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2732
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One judge's excess very well may be another's moderation.").
247. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text (discussing the states development
of constitutional standards after Haslip, and the trend to include stricter judicial review).
248. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (claiming that a standard of
review for excessiveness based on the conduct of a defendant and his potential damage
"comes close to relying upon nothing more than [the Court's] own subjective reaction to a
particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the award violates the
Constitution").
249. See id.
250. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text. After Haslip, courts commonly
included some reasonableness evaluation, whether it be a specific prong of the analysis or
simply an aspect of the procedural test. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
252. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719-20. These procedural safeguards include the imposition of
the award by an impartial jury, and review of the award by the trial and appellate courts.
Id.
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essary.253 The Court applies a minimal standard of scrutiny where eco-
nomic regulation is concerned because the Court generally disapproves of
the use of due process as a method to limit economic regulation.2 "4 As
such, the Court may have viewed punitive damages as a form of economic
regulation, and, accordingly, applied a low level of scrutiny.2"' Finally,
the Court may have been concerned that a higher level of review of sub-
stantive due process would create excess litigation.25 6
Despite this low level of scrutiny, the plurality attempted to retain a
substantive element in its review, but it actually crafted a method of re-
view that failed to provide any substantive protection.25 7 The clear
message in the plurality's approach is that if a court follows the proper
procedures when determining the propriety of punitive damages, then the
award will be deemed reasonable, regardless of the amount.258 The
Court's decision thus nullifies several key reasons to recognize a substan-
tive component: (1) to avoid arbitrary awards, and (2) to prevent addi-
tional litigation that is likely to occur because there are no clear standards
by which to determine whether an award is reasonable.
25 9
2. Unclear Standards of Procedural Due Process
The Court's analysis in TXO is bifurcated, focusing on both substantive
and procedural due process elements, yet emphasizing different factors in
the analysis of each element.2 ° Ironically, the Court's analysis of the
substantive element adds confusion to the standards that procedural due
253. See Riggs, supra note 6, at 878. Professor Riggs explained that substantive due
process protection against punitive damages currently "adds essentially nothing to existing
state law on the subject." Id. He noted that "[e]vidence relevant to show that a particular
award is grossly excessive under the due process clause can be used to attack the jury
verdict under state law." Id. Substantive due process merely serves to affirm the result of
the application of state standards of excessiveness. Id. at 880.
254. Id. at 877 (stating that there is "general disfavor" for economic substantive due
process).
255. 1& (noting that the application of substantive due process limits on punitive dam-
age awards may indicate "a revival of the discredited economic substantive due process
doctrine").
256. Id at 878.
257. Id& (concluding that the deferential type of review associated with economic sub-
stantive due process would not afford defendants much protection).
258. The plurality also indicated that a judgment is entitled to a strong presumption, or
even an irrebuttable presumption, of validity as long as the courts follow proper proce-
dures. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2719-20 (1993).
259. See May, supra note 2, at 612-13 (indicating that the substantive due process analy-
sis in Haslip left many issues unresolved and invites future litigation).
260. See generally TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721-23; supra notes 193-231 and accompanying
text (discussing the TXO decision). Compare TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721-23 with Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994) (focusing exclusively on procedural due
process).
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2611process requires. More specifically, the Court has failed to determine
what procedures a court must implement to satisfy due process when
awarding punitive damages.262 This element of the procedural due pro-
cess equation remains undefined, despite the Court's numerous decisions
concerning punitive damages.
One of the touchstones of procedural due process is to constrain the
jury's discretion to award punitive damages. 263 Judicial review is a pri-
mary method for achieving this limitation.2 " Despite the importance of
this aspect of procedural due process, there is no clear standard defining
its constitutional limits. 265 More significantly, the TXO Court's approach
clearly does not meet the existing constitutional standards that courts had
developed prior to TXO.
The plurality in TXO emphasized the potential harm of TXO's conduct
as a justification for the jury's decision to give such a large award to Alli-
ance. 266 The lower courts probably will adopt the potential harm ap-
proach that the Court utilized in TXO, just as they adopted the Haslip
approaches. 267 Unfortunately, the TXO approach diminishes the consti-
261. Similarly, in Haslip, the Court focused on the procedural components, yet its rea-
soning affected both the procedural and substantive component in cases that followed. See
supra notes 153-92 (discussing the development of the law after Haslip). However, as
Justice Scalia pointed out, a procedural approach necessarily involves some substantive
review of the award. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). Moreover,
the distinction between substantive and procedural due process is artificial, because the
requirement that the court must limit jury discretion operates on an assumption of substan-
tive measures; namely, that an award can be unconstitutionally excessive simply because of
its size. Riggs, supra note 6, at 885. The Court's analysis of one due process factor has an
equal effect on interpretations of the other. Id. at 886.
262. See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2341 n.10. In Honda, the Court addressed the question of
which procedures are necessary to satisfy due process. Id. at 2334. The Court conducted
its evaluation by focusing on the differences between the Oregon procedures at issue and
the traditional common law approach. Id at 2335. Honda did not, however, "pose the
more difficult question of what standard of review is constitutionally required." Id. at 2341
n.10. Thus, while Honda may have explained what procedural elements are plainly re-
quired, it did not answer the question of the shape that those procedural elements should
assume. Id
263. Riggs, supra note 6, at 898 ("The lack of adequate guidelines to cabin jury discre-
tion in fixing the size of punitive damages is perhaps the central due process issue.").
264. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (indicating that judicial review is an important safe-
guard against uncontrolled jury discretion).
265. See supra notes 153-92 (discussing variant approaches after Haslip). Compare
Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2341 n.10 (indicating that some courts require deferential review) with
id. at 2334 (citing cases indicating that Haslip included a " 'clear constitutional mandate for
meaningful judicial scrutiny of punitive damage awards' ") (citations omitted).
266. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721-23 (1993);
Newman & Ahmuty, supra note 237, at 3 (noting TXO's focus on potential harm).
267. See BLATr, supra note 2, at 35 (indicating that the common response to Haslip is
the comparison of the state scheme to the punitive damage scheme that Haslip approved);
1 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 5, § 4.17, at 4-32 (Supp. 1993) (stating that as a result
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tutional requirements for punitive damages because it affords unbridled
discretion to the jury and in judicial review.
26 8
Both before and after Haslip, courts' consideration of objective factors
limited discretion to award punitive damages.2 69 Yet the plurality in
TXO focused on potential harm, a highly subjective factor.270  The
Court's reliance on this highly subjective factor represents a retreat from
the use of objective factors to define due process requirements.27' More-
over, the use of such a subjective factor is contrary to the general trend of
utilizing objective factors in evaluating punitive damage awards.2" The
tendency of the lower courts to consider objective factors was most ap-
parent following Haslip, probably due to the Court's reliance on an ob-
jective factor to evaluate the award in that case.273 Thus, after Haslip,
of Haslip, courts have been evaluating their procedures to determine if they satisfy the
standards announced in Haslip); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1311 (indicating that
Haslip resulted in courts evaluating punitive damages based on the proportionality frame-
work utilized by the Haslip Court). Because courts followed the proportionality frame-
work of Haslip, it is likely that they also will follow the potential harm framework
established in TXO.
268. Riggs, supra note 6, at 894 (stating that the key question is "whether the discretion
of the jury in finding liability and determining the amount of the award is so unbounded as
to be standardless, and hence fundamentally unfair"); see also Frey & Tager, supra note
236, at 8 (noting that the TXO Court focused on the concept of potential harm, and dis-
cussing computational difficulties in analyzing potential harm).
269. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing intensive, objective scru-
tiny of excessiveness standards); supra notes 154-60 (discussing objective evaluations of
reasonableness).
270. See supra notes 266-68 (discussing the subjective nature of potential harm). TXO
illustrates the extreme difficulty that courts could face when computing the subjective
value of potential harm. In TXO, the parties offered different figures for potential harm,
ranging from one million dollars to over eight million dollars. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722. As
computed by Alliance, the potential harm of TXO's actions was between $5 and $8.3 mil-
lion. Id The Court gave little credence to these estimates and refused to rely on them in
its analysis. Id.; see id at 2734-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) used to rely on them in its
analysis. Id; see id at 2734-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the unrealistic nature
of Alliance's estimates). Instead, the plurality seemed to rely on a figure of one million
dollars in potential harm to support its conclusion that the award was reasonable. Id at
2722. This figure was completely speculative as well. Id. at 2734-35 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
271. Several members of the Court have criticized the plurality's reliance on potential
harm. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "I do not agree
that this provides a constitutionally adequate foundation for concluding that the punitive
damages verdict against TXO was rational"); id at 2736 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I am
therefore unpersuaded by the plurality's assertion that this award may be upheld based on
the potential harm to respondents or TXO's potential gain.").
272. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text (highlighting the development of
objective measures of reasonableness).
273. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (relying on the
existence of a four to one ratio between actual and punitive damages to affirm the award).
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lower courts searched for objective factors on which to base their review
whenever possible. 74
TXO's reliance on an extremely subjective factor is likely to reverse
this trend and lessen the importance of objective evaluations of due pro-
cess in punitive damages cases. Before TXO, if the jury focused on sub-
jective factors that were not fully presented, the courts deemed the award
to be the result of unbridled jury discretion and, thus, unconstitutional.275
The risk associated with TXO is that the jury will not consider more ap-
propriate, objective factors and will remain unconstrained.2 76 TXO's re-
liance on a subjective factor thwarts the due process requirements that
the Court previously imposed, including the central requirement that
courts limit jury discretion.277
If jury discretion is unconstrained, then judicial review must be particu-
larly intense to protect due process interests. 278 Courts often required
judicial review that incorporated an analysis of several factors because
they found an analysis of only one factor to be insufficient. 279 After Has-
lip, courts held that the Constitution required judicial review to include a
multi-factor evaluation.280 As a result, courts currently consider numer-
ous factors when conducting judicial review of punitive damages awards,
including factors in addition to those that the jury considered.81
The multi-factor evaluation was clearly an important procedural safe-
guard to constrain jury discretion.28 2 The TXO decision fails, both ex-
plicitly and implicitly, either to advance this procedural safeguard or to
274. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Haslip require-
ment that the jury focus on objective factors to limit its discretion).
276. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text.
278. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2348 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[tihe Court should inspect.., the procedures employed-at trial and on
appeal-to fix the amount of punitive damages").
279. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of multi-
factor analysis).
280. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1991) (approving of the
Alabama approach in which both the trial and appellate courts consider several standards,
thus satisfying due process). Either in form or in substance, the courts followed Haslip's
constitutional mandate by considering numerous factors. See Glasscock v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that Texas' use of a variety of
factors satisfied due process).
281. See Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991) (discussing
additional factors a reviewing court must consider); supra notes 84-91, 167-71 and accom-
panying text.
282. Honda indicated that judicial review is a crucial factor in limiting jury discretion.
See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2340-41 & n.11 (stating that "[e]mpirical evidence, in fact, sup-
ports the importance of judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards").
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define what approach to judicial review is constitutionally mandated. Im-
plicitly, the Justices who affirmed the award relied on a single factor to
find the award reasonable. 83 This approach indicates that the considera-
tion of only one factor satisfies the requirement of meaningful judicial
review, thereby reducing the scope of due process protections.2M
Further, TXO explicitly failed to define what type of review is "mean-
ingful" enough to satisfy due process. 5 While Haslip indicated that
standardless judicial review is unconstitutional,286 the TXO Court did not
explain what these standards required. Instead, the Court merely found
that the procedures that the lower courts used in the instant case were
sufficient. 2 7 This approach invites litigation because the Court's decision
is limited to the specific system existing in TXO. Any system that varies
from that system is open to constitutional attack. 2a These undefined
standards make it impossible for the development of any consistent con-
283. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722 (relying on potential harm to affirm the award). Although
the Court also considered TXO's actions and the relationship between punitive and actual
damages, the decision clearly is based on potential harm. Id. at 2721-22. It is solely the
potential harm aspect that leads to the conclusion that the relationship between actual and
punitive damages is not excessive. Id. at 2722. Without the potential harm factor, the
Court would not have upheld the award. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's approach considered
only one factor-the malice of the defendant. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
In contrast, the state supreme court, in upholding the award, focused on potential harm
as well as two other factors, the maliciousness of TXO's actions and the amount required
to deter TXO in the future. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d
870, 889 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
284. In justifying such a low level of review, the Court simply indicated that the fact
that the jury calculated the award without statutory guidance does not require a higher
standard of review. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719-20.
285. Honda did not answer this question either. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2341 n.10; Id. at
2343 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
286. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1376 (stating the Haslip suggests that
"states with open-ended appellate review schemes are vulnerable to constitutional attack
on the ground that their review of punitive damages awards is vague and arbitrary, and
therefore violates due process").
287. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724. Thus, TXO has the same problem as Haslip: it does not
address variations from the procedural scheme that the lower court employed, and it does
not explain how to determine whether a particular scheme in another case violates due
process. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2343 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that neither Haslip
nor TXO clearly defined the due process requirements in a punitive damages context);
May, supra note 2, at 601.
288. Justice Scalia noted this concern in Haslip, when he indicated that "[w]e have ex-
pended much ink upon the due-process implications of punitive damages, and the fact-
specific nature of the Court's opinion guarantees that we and other courts will expend
much more in the years to come." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 39 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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stitutional procedure.28 9 Thus, the level of procedural due process pro-
tection in different jurisdictions will be subjective, and, consequently,
defendants are likely to receive varying levels of constitutional
protection.29 0
B. Balancing the Role of Judge and Jury
In both awarding and reviewing punitive damages, courts apply specific
factors as mandated by a particular jurisdiction.29' Courts apply the fac-
tors based on the evidence and the findings of the trier-of-fact. 29 If the
record supports the interpretation of the relevant factors, then the court
will not find that the award violates due process.293 This approach bal-
ances the central role of the jury in awarding punitive damages with the
realization that judicial review must include a check on the jury to pre-
vent the risk of arbitrary deprivation of property.294
The use of the potential harm analysis in TXO to uphold the award
does not sufficiently preserve this balance. The jury did not formally con-
sider potential harm, and the plurality can identify only two instances of
potential harm on the record.295 Even these references, however, were
extremely minimal, and neither trial counsel nor the court formally
289. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihis type of re-
view, far from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could become as
fickle as the process it is designed to superintend").
290. While the Honda Court indicated that it did not address this question, its opinion
may indicate the method that the Court is likely to use in the future to determine what
method of review is required to satisfy due process. Honda established that the due pro-
cess test includes a comparison of the procedure at issue to "traditional procedures."
Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2335. Thus, the question of what standard of review is appropriate
may be analyzed in this framework. However, given various methods of judicial review
that courts have employed, it would seem almost impossible to establish a constitutional
principle in this manner.
291. See MGW, Inc. v. Fredricks Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888,896-97 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (indicating that appellate court review must include a consideration of whether the
record supports the amount of the award); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808
S.W.2d 590, 605 (Tex. App. Ct. 1991) (indicating that the court must evaluate reasonable-
ness by examining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the amount of the award).
292. MGW, 6 Ca. Rptr. 2d at 896-97; Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 605.
293. MGW, 6 Ca. Rptr. 2d at 896-97; Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 605.
294. See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2341 (stating that the purpose of judicial review is to
protect against the danger of arbitrary awards). This concept recognizes the somewhat
conflicting principles that while the court must respect the role of the jury in awarding
punitive damages, too much jury discretion may violate procedural due process. May,
supra note 2, at 590.
295. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721-22 (1993).
First, the court advised the jury to consider harm "likely to occur from the defendant's
conduct" in computing its award. Id. at 2721 (citations omitted). Second, the Court found
that the closing arguments of counsel indicated that the jury considered potential harm.
Id. at 2722.
[Vol. 44:631
1995] TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 671
presented the question of potential harm to the jury.2" Similarly, the
appellate court did not rely on the potential harm of TXO's conduct in
affirming the verdict.2" Thus, none of the judicial entities that evaluated
the punitive damage award prior to the United States Supreme Court
relied heavily on potential harm.298
By relying on a factor not presented to the jury, the Court ultimately
interfered with an essential aspect of the common-law system of awarding
punitive damages: the jury.2" Throughout its discussion of the common-
law system in Haslip, the Court focused on the importance of the jury and
the traditional role that the jury plays in the punitive damages system.3°°
Although judicial review serves to balance the jury's role, the jury is the
central component in the system, and it must be respected to satisfy due
process.
The TXO Court's approach clearly undermines the jury's role in
awarding punitive damages. By focusing on factors other than those
presented to the jury, the Court took the ultimate decision away from the
jury.310 After TXO, appellate courts may substitute their judgment for
that of the jury, an act inconsistent with traditional notions of due pro-
cess.3°  This approach should be compared with constitutionally accepta-
ble cases in which reviewing courts considered those factors upon which
296. See id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "Justice O'Connor demon-
strates that the record in this case does not contain evidence, argument, or instructions
regarding the potential harm from TXO's conduct"). Justice Kennedy noted that even if
the jury did consider the harm likely to result from TXO's action, it did so without any
evidence or supporting argument. Id at 2725. Moreover, Alliance created the formal con-
sideration of the potential harm of TXO's actions solely for the United States Supreme
Court. Id at 2734 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Alliance's potential harm "esti-
mate appeared for the first time after this Court granted certiorari, having been produced
exclusively for our consumption").
297. Even if the lower court did consider potential harm, this clearly was not the focus
of either the trial or appellate court's analysis. Had the court given it more attention, the
parties obviously would have briefed the issue prior to doing so for the United States
Supreme Court. Id
298. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2734.
299. Riggs, supra note 6, at 900. Indeed, it is almost a universal understanding that the
jury plays the most influential aspect in determine punitive damage awards. Id. While any
procedural analysis strives to limit jury discretion, its ultimate goal is to protect the jury's
traditional role in making an award. Despite the inherently subjective nature of fixing the
amount of punitive damages, it is a function that must be left to the jury. Id.
300. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1991) (describing the
traditional role of the jury in awarding punitive damages).
301. In many instances, reviewing courts contemplate factors other than those consid-
ered by the jury. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. However, rather than
replacing the jury's analysis, these courts consider the additional factors in conjunction
with those that the jury considers. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
302. See Riggs, supra note 6, at 900.
Catholic University Law Review
the jury relied.3"3 If the reviewing court can base its decision solely on a
factor that the jury did not consider, then the jury has a minimal role in
the assessment of punitive damages. Thus, the TXO approach interferes
with the foundations of the due process equation by muddling the proper
role of the jury.3°4
C. The Need for Objective Standards
The TXO decision indicates that an adequate definition of due process
clearly requires objective standards. 05 As the lower courts' approaches
indicate, objective standards successfully can provide a more principled
basis for constitutional evaluation. Such objective tests can limit jury dis-
cretion and ensure meaningful judicial review, satisfying the procedural
aspect.30 6 They also can define reasonableness, satisfying substantive due
process.30 7 Although such tests vary greatly, they fufili due process re-
quirements by ensuring a minimal level of constitutional protection.308
The Court may have hesitated to establish more objective standards
because of its desire not to effectuate a radical shift in the law of punitive
damages.3°9 However, such an objective approach merely would estab-
lish the range of constitutionally sufficient measures to impose punitive
303. See supra note 75, 90 and accompanying text (discussing the need for judicial re-
view based on the record from the courts below).
304. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (discussing the importance of the jury's role in
protecting against unreasonable punitive damages).
305. While it is true that, based on the factual context, punitive damages vary to a great
extent, there remains the possibility of creating objective tests of due process. This Note
recognizes the difficulty of creating such tests. See May, supra note 2, at 577 (stating that
"[t]he point at which an award of punitive damages becomes either unfair or irrational
presents a matter of considerable conjecture because procedural and substantive due pro-
cess notions refuse reduction into a single idea, case, or concept"). Further, the Court
historically has avoided the creation of objective tests in the context of due process, focus-
ing instead on the concept of "fairness." R. McKenna Richards, Jr., Note, Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip: Punitive Damages and the Modem Meaning of Procedural
Due Process, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1362, 1377-81 (1992) (discussing examples of fairness as
applied in the due process context).
306. See supra notes 161-83 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (discussing substantive objective
tests).
308. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text (noting that the utilization of a
variety of objective factors satisfied due process). As Justice O'Connor noted, one objec-
tive test that could be used in this context is the Mathews test. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (creating a three-pronged test to determine what process is due
in an administrative hearing). This test could be used in a punitive damages context to
evaluate whether the procedural framework adequately protects the defendant. TXO, 113
S. Ct. at 231-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
309. See Ennis, supra note 13, at 587 (indicating that it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will issue any decisions that would require great changes in state proceedings on
punitive damages).
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damage awards; it would not necessarily mandate wholesale modifica-
tions to all state punitive damages systems.310 Thus, an objective stan-
dard would be the best method to define the constitutional limits of due
process for punitive damage defendants.31'
The result of the Court's failure to adopt a more objective and princi-
pled test will be continuous, case-by-case attacks on punitive damages.
312
Without a clearer definition of the contours of due process requirements,
the law is highly uncertain.313
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that civil defendants en-
joy federal constitutional protection against excessive punitive damages
awards. The Court recognizes this protection on two intertwined, but
equally important, levels: procedural and substantive. Unfortunately, the
Court has not developed clear standards to apply this protection. The
310. Ild. at 595 (indicating that if due process "requires reasonably objective or predict-
able standards for setting the amount of punitive damage awards" it would only provide
the outer limits to punitive damage systems).
311. Riggs, supra note 6, at 903. Professor Riggs indicated that "ways undoubtedly
could be devised to give the jury more precise guidelines for fixing the size of the award."
Id.
312. See supra notes 151-92 and accompanying text (discussing the adjudicatory, ad hoc
result of Haslip); see also Sarah Stevens and Larry Lempert, One Year After Haslip, State
Systems for Awards Mostly Withstand Challenge, 24 SEc. REG. & L. REP., (BNA) 347, 347
(1992) (indicating that at least 32 decisions have rejected constitutional challenges). It is
expected that TXO will increase this amount substantially. The unclear nature of the deci-
sion means that TXO is likely to further efforts for legislative reform of punitive damages.
See Frey & Tager, supra note 236, at 8 (noting that TXO is likely to shift the focus to
legislation and state common law for changes in punitive damages context); Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Questions Linger on Punitives and Evidence, 15 NAT'L L. J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S4
(noting that TXO is likely to fuel demands for caps on the amount of punitive damages).
313. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 49 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that due process requires confidence that procedures produce "fair and reasonable
results. When we lose that confidence, a change must be made.") See John E. Calfee &
Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA.
L. REv. 965, 986-94 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty leads to economic inefficiency); Kile,
supra note 3, at 143 (indicating that punitive damages chill industrial research, and may
affect insurance coverage) (citations omitted); Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 3, at 1371
(stating that "[v]ague and uncertain punitive damages law has a substantial and detrimen-
tal impact on American industry [and] undermines confidence in the civil justice system")
(footnote omitted). Alternatively, some commentators argue that punitive damages are
beneficial to provide a remedy that criminal law cannot address. Sloane, supra note 1, at
476. Nonetheless, the lack of predictability interferes with the administration of justice
because it will force lower courts to clarify any meaningful constitutional standards. New-
man & Ahmuty, supra note 237, at 3 (stating that courts continue to have difficulty defin-
ing the constitutional contours of punitive damages); Mullenix, supra note 312, at S4
(indicating that TXO failed to establish a meaningful standard).
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Court's analysis in TXO promotes uncertainty in due process and under-
mines the due process standards developed in lower courts.
The recognition of a constitutional right demands that the Court explic-
itly prescribe the standards used to define that right. In affirming the
right but repeatedly failing to define the standards, the Supreme Court
invites various subjective and inconsistent applications of those protec-
tions. The Court has created a framework for evaluating punitive dam-
ages without giving the lower courts the tools to apply that framework
consistently. Thus, the constitutional protection afforded punitive dam-
ages defendants is illusory, or minimal at best.
David F. Cutter
